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ALFELLAGA 175was clear to the Malian Government that the goum and the GNIG14 alone couldnot end the rebellion. Therefore the CCA's of the Malian Armed Forces weresent in. All parties involved until that moment, the ifulagen, the goumiers andthe Kel Adagh in general were quick to learn that the new adversary would notfight by the rules. Women and religious persons were arrested or killed, and sowere men who had not participated in combat. Wells were poisoned and cattlewere killed. It therefore comes as no surprise that many goumiers deserted theMalian forces to join the ifulagen. One of the first to do so was Azzezen agIksa. Having first fought against the ifulagen, he would become one of theirmain military leaders and the last to surrender his arms. 44 At the end ofSeptember 1963, after (or during) a battle between the rebels and the army atthe well of Arli, in the Wadi Ouzzein, a group of nineteen goumiers defected tothe rebels. 45 The methods applied by the Malian Armed Forces went againsttheir ethics as warriors and their feelings of belonging to the Kel Adagh. Afterall, the people under attack were ‘their people’ and the people who attackedthem were not. Moreover, the Malian Armed Forces attacked the wrong people,the civilians, instead of the warriors. That the Southern Malian officers had nohigh opinion of their effectiveness will not have helped to sustain their loyaltyeither, in contrast with the ifulagen who knew with whom they were dealing.Concepts of egha and subsequent aqqa counter attacks do not exclude feelingsof respect or tribal affiliation.With the change in tactics by the Malian forces, the tactics of the ifulagenaltered similarly. The camel herds of the goum forces were no longer the solefocus of their raids. The tribal chiefs who assisted the regime to talk the rebelsinto surrender were raided as well. Above all, even the herds of the civilianpopulation in and outside the Adagh were now targeted. The indignation of thefighters about the atrocities of the army on one hand and their own plunderingon the other hand seem to be in striking contradiction. But by that stage theMalian forces had clearly abandoned the code of conduct of civilised warfare asit was known in the Adagh. The concept of aqqa was no longer valid. Therebels’ later attacks on all and sundry are akafal: Barbarism against barbarism. 46On one hand, akafal means war against non-Kel Tamasheq, which this clearlywas. In these wars, honour was not at stake and could therefore not be damagedby one’s own actions. Therefore, no pardon or rule was necessary. On the other444546After the end of the rebellion, Azzezen ag Iksa stayed in Algeria. In January 1971,he returned to Mali where he symbolically surrendered his gun. He was sent toBamako where he was released under the National Reconciliation Act proclaimedby Moussa Traoré in 1978.Mali, Tableau des forces armées et forces publiques du Mali au 1er mai 1964.CHETOM – 15 H 77-2c.Claudot-Hawad, H. 1993b.