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262 CHAPTER 6sheq from Mali. Moreover, the movement used Southern Algeria as its ‘hinterland’where they repleted their provisions, treated their injured, and went for‘rest and recreation’. Apart from these practical arguments the Algerian Governmentrose to the occasion to strengthen its importance as a regional power, tothe detriment of what it considered its close rivals: France and Libya.The only common language for negotiations was French. This meant that theishumar had to rely on the Tamasheq évolués who were sympathetic to themovement. 22 From the side of the rebels, the negotiators included Cheick agBaye, Acherif ag Mohamed and Ibrahim ag Litny, three intellectuals who hadjoined the movement from the beginning. These évolués, headed by militaryleader Iyad ag Ghali (himself a true ishumar, but with enough Francophoneeducation to conduct negotiations in this language) had a more realist view ofthe situation than some of the more idealist ishumar. And of course, Iyad knewperfectly well in what state and condition his troops were. Nevertheless, theTamanrasset Agreement showed a radical stance from the Tanekra side. It consistedof a ceasefire, stipulating the mutual transfer of prisoners of war; theArmy’s gradual withdrawal from the North; the transfer of administration tocivil servants; the withdrawal of the rebel forces to their bases; the possibilityfor the fighters to integrate in the Malian Armed Forces; and the creation ofcommissions to monitor the application of the agreements made. The TamanrassetAgreement was never fully implemented, but it remained a blueprint forfuture negotiations. The importance of the agreement does not lie in what it wassupposed to lead to, but in what it did lead to in practice. Most of my interlocutorswho had participated in the Tanekra movement and the rebellion fromits first days onwards insisted that the ‘real’ rebellion ended with the signing ofthe Tamanrasset Agreement. With the benefit of hindsight, one can indeedconclude from the developments after the signing of the Tamanrasset Agreement,that this observation contains some truth. The ishumar reaction to theTamanrasset Agreement can be summed up as negative for the most part. Manyishumar fighters were at least disappointed, but many more were outraged bywhat they perceived as a sell-out from the side of the évolués. After ‘Tamanrasset’the second phase of the rebellion started. The Tamasheq movement,united in the first six months of fighting, split internally over the goals of therebellion.22From the side of the Government, the negotiators most likely included Issa Ongoiba(former right hand to Diby Sillas Diarra) and a number of tribal chiefs.