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246 CHAPTER 5or ‘executions of traitors’ were committed that year. 108 In 1986, the AlgerianGovernment forcefully expelled about 6,000 Malian Kel Tamasheq and another2,000 Kel Tamasheq from Niger to their respective countries. Perhaps theseexpulsions too can be seen in the light of the ongoing conflicts between ishumarin Algeria, which threatened the security in Tamanrasset and other Algeriancities. Whatever the facts may have been, the story is now interpreted in thecontext of the ongoing struggles for power and dominancy within the movementof various currents, and especially between various tewsiten. Despite allideals, discourse and rhetoric on ‘one country, one goal, one people’, unity wasfar from a daily reality. Among the ishumar as among their less revolutionaryinclined kindred, tewsit infa temust: Tribe prevailed over nation.The later years of the TanekraDespite dissent within the movement, the organisation slowly gained strength.The number of trained fighters with ample combat experience steadily increaseduntil the return in 1986 of the Tamasheq units who had fought in Chad in theLibyan campaigns. In 1987, the movement was again renewed, now alsospreading to Mali. Small groups of ishumar returned there and settled in andaround Kidal, Gao and Ménaka. Weapons were bought and hidden in Mali forthe moment rebellion would break out. Nevertheless, the inter-tribal conflictshad resulted in a more or less formalised division of the fighters into units basedon tribal affiliation. The fighters were grouped in three battalions. The Kidalbattalion consisted of Kel Adagh. The Ménaka battalion consisted of fightersfrom that area. A third battalion, the Gao battalion, consisted of fighters fromthe surroundings of Gao city. Members of these battalions, as well as part of themovement’s leadership positioned themselves in their respective areas. However,the Malian regime had remained on alert with regards to the movements ofthe ishumar in Mali. The failed attacks in Mali and Niger in 1982 and the attackin Niger in 1985, together with constant cases of treason within the movement,had made the Traoré Regime aware that something was planned. Possibly, contactsbetween the movement and the Libyan and Algerian secret services, andtheir respective contacts with the Malian and French secret services, had contributedto Malian knowledge of the movement. On 9 April 1990, the regionalsecurity service in Gao arrested a member of the organisation. After interrogationhe admitted to membership of the Tanekra movement. On 23 May 1990,the arrest of seven other members and the capture of an arms deposit furtherdamaged the movement’s plans. 109 The Malian security forces also arrested the108Bourgeot, A. 1990.109‘Etat d’urgence à Gao’. Les Echos, 28/09/1990.