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Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

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Chapter IV — Narrative <strong>of</strong> Events <strong>of</strong> February and March 2011<br />

which <strong>the</strong> national dialogue could be held. This proposal<br />

would eliminate all <strong>the</strong> negative aspects <strong>of</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r proposals<br />

and would provide <strong>the</strong> following positive features:<br />

i. A dialogue on political reform should be undertaken in<br />

a constitutional institution that is governed by rules <strong>of</strong><br />

procedure, mechanisms and specific deadlines and<br />

timelines, and not in <strong>the</strong> form <strong>of</strong> a workshop, which is<br />

not a legal structure and which is incapable <strong>of</strong><br />

producing a result <strong>of</strong> a legal nature that achieves <strong>the</strong><br />

desired constitutional reform.<br />

ii. An elected Constituent Assembly would reflect <strong>the</strong> true<br />

weight <strong>of</strong> each party in society.<br />

iii. A Constituent Assembly would be a forum for national<br />

dialogue that would not be based on sectarianism.<br />

iv. Differences in opinion are normal, but <strong>the</strong>re would be a<br />

way to find common ground through a Constituent<br />

Assembly, especially since <strong>the</strong> election campaigns held<br />

before <strong>the</strong> elections would give <strong>the</strong> parties an<br />

opportunity to outline <strong>the</strong>ir views on <strong>the</strong> political<br />

system <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> country.<br />

v. The Constituent Assembly would protect <strong>the</strong> dialogue<br />

from developments that could lead to its failure, such<br />

as foreign intervention or <strong>the</strong> withdrawal <strong>of</strong> any<br />

parties.<br />

vi. HRH <strong>the</strong> Crown Prince, within <strong>the</strong> current<br />

constitutional structure, does not have a mandate to<br />

conduct this dialogue. Even <strong>the</strong> mandate issued for<br />

him to conduct <strong>the</strong> dialogue did not come in a form<br />

stipulated in <strong>the</strong> constitution. Therefore, <strong>the</strong>re is no<br />

constitutional basis for HRH <strong>the</strong> Crown Prince to<br />

conduct this dialogue or to implement its results.<br />

vii. This proposal would deflate public anger and direct<br />

attention towards <strong>the</strong> Constituent Assembly.<br />

viii. Electing a Constituent Assembly has been <strong>the</strong> preferred<br />

option <strong>of</strong> many o<strong>the</strong>r countries that experienced similar<br />

events.<br />

ix. If this proposal is not adopted, <strong>the</strong>re is nothing that can<br />

guarantee that <strong>the</strong> ceiling <strong>of</strong> demands will not rise<br />

fur<strong>the</strong>r. At that point, <strong>the</strong> Constituent Assembly may<br />

no longer be an acceptable solution.<br />

x. The result <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dialogue must be <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> a<br />

new constitution that comes into force upon adoption.<br />

107

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