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Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

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Chapter IV — Narrative <strong>of</strong> Events <strong>of</strong> February and March 2011<br />

be discussed. This proposal was not accepted by <strong>the</strong> GoB, and ultimately, <strong>the</strong><br />

negotiations ended.<br />

672. If HRH <strong>the</strong> Crown Prince’s initiative to hold a national dialogue at<br />

<strong>the</strong> time had been accepted, it could have paved <strong>the</strong> way for significant<br />

constitutional and political reform in <strong>Bahrain</strong>.<br />

673. The reluctance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposition to accept <strong>the</strong> initiative <strong>of</strong> HRH <strong>the</strong><br />

Crown Prince seems to have been due to a number <strong>of</strong> factors. Primarily, it<br />

seems that some in <strong>the</strong> opposition parties, particularly Al Wefaq, were<br />

unwilling to accept proposals presented by HRH <strong>the</strong> Crown Prince in light <strong>of</strong><br />

what seems to have been a belief in <strong>the</strong>ir ability to achieve greater political<br />

gains given <strong>the</strong> momentum and strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> protest movement. Second, it<br />

has been indicated to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> by some members <strong>of</strong> opposition parties,<br />

particularly Al Wefaq, that <strong>the</strong>y doubted <strong>the</strong> willingness <strong>of</strong> some within <strong>the</strong><br />

political establishment to accept any substantial alteration <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> governance<br />

system in <strong>Bahrain</strong>. Third, <strong>the</strong> reluctance <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> opposition to conclude an<br />

agreement with HRH <strong>the</strong> Crown Prince and to enter a national dialogue before<br />

certain preconditions were met, such as dismissing <strong>the</strong> government, and<br />

without previously agreed principles, parameters, and implementation<br />

mechanisms is also imputable to <strong>the</strong> general mistrust that <strong>the</strong> opposition<br />

harboured towards <strong>the</strong> GoB. The most salient reason for this lack <strong>of</strong> trust is<br />

what has been described to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> as a sense <strong>of</strong> betrayal that was felt<br />

towards <strong>the</strong> GoB in <strong>the</strong> months and years following <strong>the</strong> adoption <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

National Action Charter in 2001. Repeatedly, opposition figures have voiced<br />

to <strong>the</strong> <strong>Commission</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir belief that <strong>the</strong> reform pledges made in <strong>the</strong> National<br />

Action Charter were yet to be fulfilled in significant part. This “trust deficit”<br />

based on previously unfulfilled government promises was an important factor<br />

in <strong>the</strong> opposition’s lack enthusiasm for engaging in <strong>the</strong> dialogue and <strong>the</strong><br />

insistence on electing a Constituent Assembly that would rewrite <strong>the</strong> whole<br />

constitution and examine all o<strong>the</strong>r political issues.<br />

169

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