Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

Chapter IV — Narrative of Events of February and March 2011
consultations with the opposition on this basis. The MoU included the
following points:
a. The dialogue should be about undertaking constitutional
amendments to the political system in the Kingdom.
b. Each side can assemble support teams composed of any
persons deemed appropriate for the negotiations.
c. A consensus during the dialogue should lead to an agreement
on amending the Constitution. After this consensus is
reached, the proposed constitutional amendments should be
presented to the people in a popular referendum. The results
of the referendum would come into force once they were
announced, on the condition that at least 70% of eligible
voters participated and that two-thirds of those voting
approved the proposed amendments. Both sides may consult
with active forces in Bahraini society to reach a national
consensus on the proposed amendments.
d. The GoB may not unilaterally present the agreements reached
at the national dialogue to a referendum without first
consulting with the opposition.
e. In case any issues are not agreed upon during the national
dialogue, the disputed matters shall be put to the people in a
referendum, to which the provisions of article (c) above shall
apply.
f. The national dialogue should begin immediately following the
agreement on these principles, and the referendum on the
results shall be held within three months of the beginning of
the dialogue.
g. The referendum shall be undertaken under full judicial
supervision.
462. In light of the provisions of the 2002 Constitution, the
implementation of these proposals required an amendment to the Constitution
to allow the results of the national dialogue to be placed before the Bahraini
people in a popular referendum. Therefore, the legal advisers of the Crown
Prince prepared a draft amendment to the Constitution which would allow for
the implementation of the agreement.
463. The MoU was shown to the leading Shia cleric Sheikh Abdulla Al-
Ghuraifi, who endorsed it. Representatives of HRH the Crown Prince also
called prominent individuals in the business community to consult on the
content of the MoU, especially regarding the questions of turning Bahrain into
a single electoral district and the election of HRH the Prime Minister. The
position of all those contacted was that they rejected the idea of an elected
Prime Minister. In addition, some recommended that a State of National
Safety be declared.
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