Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry

Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
rubber bullets, and at times, shotgun rounds. In most cases, protestors
dispersed into the smaller streets and alleyways of their neighbourhoods. The
protestors were sometimes pursued by police personnel, either in patrol cars or
on foot. On some occasions, protestors threw stones, metal rods, Molotov
cocktails and other objects at the police. They also made roadblocks with
rocks, trees and garbage dumpsters that were occasionally overturned and set
afire.
658. The forceful confrontation and dispersion of protestors led to the first
two fatalities on 14 and 15 February. These two deaths caused a significant
increase in the number of persons participating in protests. Many were
angered at the use of force against protestors, and, therefore, participated in
the funerals of these victims, which then were transformed into marches and
rallies raising political demands. By 15 February, the GCC Roundabout had
become the epicentre of demonstrations and the primary destination for
marches coming from other parts of Manama and neighbouring villages.
659. To restore order, the GoB decided to clear the GCC Roundabout of
all protestors on 17 February. During that operation four individuals were
fatally wounded by the police, which brought the total number of deaths to
six. The GoB then deployed BDF units to secure the GCC Roundabout and to
deny demonstrators access to it. The next day, as groups of protestors
attempted to re-enter the GCC Roundabout, another person was fatally
wounded in the vicinity of a BDF roadblock. The deaths caused by the police
and the implication of the military in the shooting of a civilian exacerbated
public anger towards the GoB.
660. The available evidence and the progression of events during these
days do not indicate that orders were issued to the police to use lethal force
against demonstrators. However, as discussed in Chapter VI, Section B, the
Commission has found that police units used force against civilians in a
manner that was both unnecessary and disproportionate. This was due, at
least partially, to inadequate training of field units, ineffectual command and
control systems and, at times, insufficient numbers of police to handle
demonstrators.
661. Police confrontations with the demonstrators and the apparent
unwillingness of the GoB to address popular demands, added to the anger on
the streets and resulted in more violent confrontations between demonstrators
and security forces.
662. At this stage, with the approval of HM the King, HRH the Crown
Prince took the initiative to engage with the leaders of the demonstrators and
the opposition in search of a negotiated resolution of concerns about
constitutional and socio-economic reforms. In the following days, HRH the
Crown Prince was instrumental in securing the withdrawal of the BDF from
the streets of Manama, reopening the GCC Roundabout to demonstrators and
launching discussions with the opposition on resolving the unfolding crisis.
663. This marked the beginning of the second stage in the evolution of the
policy of the GoB in dealing with the developments in Bahrain. During this
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