The Descent of Man

their comrades; and surely their conduct ought
to be considered as moral. As far as deliberation,
and the victory over opposing motives are
concerned, animals may be seen doubting between
opposed instincts, in rescuing their offspring
or comrades from danger; yet their actions,
though done for the good of others, are
not called moral. Moreover, anything performed
very often by us, will at last be done without
deliberation or hesitation, and can then
hardly be distinguished from an instinct; yet
surely no one will pretend that such an action
ceases to be moral. On the contrary, we all feel
that an act cannot be considered as perfect, or
as performed in the most noble manner, unless
it be done impulsively, without deliberation or
effort, in the same manner as by a man in
whom the requisite qualities are innate. He
who is forced to overcome his fear or want of
sympathy before he acts, deserves, however, in
one way higher credit than the man whose innate
disposition leads him to a good act wit-