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Informe Técnico de Consultoría ASPECTOS CONCEPTUALES Y ...

Informe Técnico de Consultoría ASPECTOS CONCEPTUALES Y ...

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AUTOR (ES):Chávez, Carlos; González, Nuria; Salgado, HugoTITULOITQs un<strong>de</strong>r illegal fishing: An application to the red shrimpfishery in ChileAÑO 2008REFERENCIAMarine Policy 32 (2008) 570–579BIBLIOGRAFICAIDIOMAInglésPALABRAS CLAVES Individual transferable quotas; Illegal fishing; Enforcement;Quota marketRESUMENWe study an individual transferable quota system withimperfect enforcement. We apply a mo<strong>de</strong>l of individualfisherman behavior to the red shrimp (Pleuronco<strong>de</strong>smonodon) fishery in central-southern Chile. Simulationresults suggest that illegal fishing could generate a 21%increase in fishing effort, resulting in a 13% increase in catchand a 2% lower quota price in comparison with the results ofa system that operates un<strong>de</strong>r perfect compliance. The resultsare sensitive to changes in the level of fish abundance, totalallowable catch, and the <strong>de</strong>sign of enforcement to inducecomplianceDIRECCIÓN DE ACCESO http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpolELECTRÓNICOA-12

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