Informe Técnico de Consultoría ASPECTOS CONCEPTUALES Y ...

AUTOR (ES):Sutines, Jon; Andersen PederTITULOThe Economics of Fisheries Law EnforcementAÑO 1985REFERENCIALand Economics Vol 16(4): 387-397BIBLIOGRAFICAIDIOMAInglésPALABRAS CLAVESRESUMENDIRECCIÓN DE ACCESOELECTRÓNICOIn his anaIysis of tbe fishery, Cheung (1970) shows thatextemalities arise when exclusive property rigbts are absent.Cheung and others (see, for example, Demsetz 1967) arguethat the presence or absence of excíusive rights dcpends on,among other things, tbe costs of defining and enforcingexelusivity. This paper explores this issue in greater deptbwitb a formal model of fisheries law enforcement to showhow fishing firms behave and fishery polieies are affected bycostly, imperfect enforcement of fisheries law. 1 This isachieved by combining standard bioeconomic theory and theeconomic theory of crime and punishment (Becker 1968).2Tbe enforcement of exclusive property rigbts has becomeincreasing1y important as the new ocean regime tendstowards removing noncxclusive rights to marine fishresources. We arguc that the cost of defining and securíngexclusive property rigbts under the new extended jurisdictionregime is a principal determinant of management measuresthat eventually will emerge. Thus, the presence ofenforcement costs may have a significant impact on fishproduction and allocation in the future as coastal states moveto regulate fishing activity in their waters. The paper isorganized as follows. Section Iillustrates the empiricalsignificance of the físheries law enforcement problem.Sections II and III briefiy present the formal model offisheries law enforcement and examine how optimalmanagement policies are affected by costly, imperfectenforcement. The final section contains a summary oftbemain results and comments on some unresolved issues.A-64