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formal application would be made on a given date before the court, which originally
imposed the suspended sentence, to have such suspension revoked and the custodial
sentence imposed. There were no formal rules of court at anyprocedural level to govern
this procedure of notification. If the convicted person failed to appear on the return date,
the court could issue a warrant to procure his/her attendance before the court would
proceedfurther with the matter.
Accordingly, any application by the prosecution to revoke the suspension of the term of
imprisonment must be on notice to the convicted person. This was not always the case.
The convicted person should always be afforded the opportunity of notice both of the
application to revoke and also of the grounds upon which such revocation is based. 136
Sufficient time should be afforded to the convicted person to prepare his/her answer to
the application and legal aid should be afforded to the convicted person to present his/her
defence. In light of these more recently identified requirements, it can be said that there
can be no automatic re-entryor revocation of the suspendedsentence.
(ii) The breach.
In the preceding section the judicially developed procedures for a valid application to
revoke a suspended sentence were set out. But when the convicted person is brought
back before the court to answer for the breach of conditions attached to the suspended
sentence what issues may arise? By what standard might the court measure whether a
breach has actually occurred and if the court has so determined such a breach, are there
degrees of transgression or non-compliance which the court will disregard?
As to the sufficiency of proofs required to allow for a valid re-activation of a suspended
sentence McCracken J. in Dignam –v- Groarke, The DPP and the Attorney General (17 th
November 2000, IEHC 150) stated:
“As some considerable argument was addressed to me in relation to the nature of
the proofs which would be necessary were the applicant to be deprived of his
liberty in the circumstances, I think I should comment briefly thereon. The first
named respondent was certainlynot bound to conduct a hearing in the nature of a
criminal trial to ascertain the guilt of the applicant in relation to the matters alleged
against him(a murder trial). That wouldbe for another dayandprobablybefore a
136 Asubsequent conviction wouldprovide proof beyonda reasonable doubt. But evidence of a breach of the peace without conviction is sufficient.
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