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juryin the present case. He did not have to satisfyhimself beyond all reasonable
doubt. What he had to do was conduct an enquiry to an extent that would
reasonably satisfy on the matters at issue, and to conduct the enquiry in
accordance with the principles of natural justice, in particular as set out in the State
(Murphy) –v- Kielt. In my view, he did not even have to conduct an enquiry in
accordance with the strict rules of evidence and he was entitled to listen to and
take account of the suspicions of D/Sgt. Kelly. Equally he would have been
entitled to look at a report from a Probation Officer. However, he is obliged to
satisfy himself that there is a basis for D/Sgt. Kelly’s suspicions, and, if such was
the case, for the views of a Probation Officer. In particular, he is also obliged to
notify the applicant or his legal advisers as to the nature of those suspicions or of
that report, give them an opportunity or sufficient time to make their own
enquiries and allowthem an opportunity to call such evidence as they might think
for, following such enquiries.” (Dignam –v- Groarke 17 th November, 2000 IEHC
150 p.4).
Thus, the judgement of McCracken J. demonstrates that the re-activation of a suspended
sentence is based upon an enquiry by the court on evidence and not necessarily to a
standard required in a criminal trial, but sufficient to allow the conclusion that the
Defendant failed to keep the peace and to be of good behaviour. 137 While a subsequent
conviction during the period of suspension might put the matter beyond doubt, and this
argument was advanced as the required standard of proof by counsel for the applicant in
Dignam –v- Groarke, the standard set ultimately by the court was of a much lower degree
without necessarily introducing even a further criminal charge against the person
conditionally bound over. Paradoxically, in the case of Dignam –v- Groarke and the State
Murphy –v- Kielt both successful applicants for judicial review were alleged to have been
involved in serious offences and yet the standard for breach set out by the courts merely
called for cogent evidence of a breach of the peace in both cases. In the Supreme Court,
Griffin J. in the State (Murphy–v- Kielt 1984, IR 458) stated:
“It is only when a decision has been reached that he has broken one or more of
the conditions that such person’s right to be at liberty may be terminated. In my
137 This standard is at variance with the standard of proof set out in the People (D.P.P.) –V- Aylmer [1995] 21LRM p.638 where Hederman J. stated the
Prosecution was obligedto establish breach beyondreasonable doubt.
326