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may apply when the court is asked to deal with an application to revoke a suspended
sentence. First, it is observed that an offender may not be liable to have a suspended
sentence revoked in respect of an offence committed byhim/her before s/he entered into
a recognizance to keep the peace (Mark McManus –v- Judge O’Sullivan and D.P.P [2007]
IEHC 50 Dunne J.). Paradoxically this is so notwithstanding the mandatory obligation
(Section 99(9)) upon a subsequent court to remand an accused back to the original
sentencing court which imposed the suspended sentence. This paradox may be explained
when the issues of time are discreetly examined. Section 99(9) obliges a subsequent court
to remand the person subject to a suspended sentence back to the original court for
consideration of revocation. However, the original court may not revoke the suspended
sentence if the offence for which s/he was convicted before the subsequent court was
committed prior to the accused entering into the recognizance. The accused simplycould
not be bound over in respect of matters prior to entry into the bond. Secondly, the High
Court in McManus (Supra) has declared that there is no “hard and fast rule” to govern the
issue of activation of a suspended sentence which is outside of or in excess of the
operational period. The period maybe exceeded for a number of reasons not all of which
maybe attributed to the prosecution. Indeed, the High Court speculated on a number of
reasons for delay which may clearly accrue to the benefit of the defendant. A defendant
may wish to call witnesses or to produce reports and may require the case to be put back
thus causing delay, indeed the operational period might run out as a result of such
adjournments. In those circumstances, it may be appropriate to allow the revocation
application to proceed notwithstanding that the operational period has expired. Critically
however, the breach of the suspended sentence must have been committed during the
operational period and during the period specified in the bond. Therefore it is essential
that the period specified in the bond and the operational period are coterminous from
beginningto end.
It is argued here that O’Siochain’s dictum that on the expiry of the period of suspension
“there is a complete discharge” (O’Siochain 1977:27) must nowbe interpreted as subject to
the provision of subsections (13) and (14) which allow for reactivation of a suspended
sentence at any time including any time after the expiration of the period of suspension,
provided the breach has occurred within the period of the suspension. In the years ahead
one can expect further litigation on this point.
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