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sentence under Section 99(1) constructs the suspended sentence on two specific time
elements⎯the period of the term of imprisonment 165 and the period of the suspension of
the sentence (previously referred to as the operative period). In the case of a part
suspended sentence, the period of imprisonment and the period of the suspension of the
sentence must be specified (Section 99(2) (a) and(b)).
In chapters 5 and 6 the period of suspension of the suspended sentence was discussed in
detail. As noted in People (D.P.P. -v- William Hogan (unreported, Court of Criminal
Appeal 4 th March 2002) Keane C.J.. deprecated the practice of suspending a sentence for a
period longer than the custodial period on the basis of the whole risk which the offender
must endure for the entire period of suspension. It is arguable that if this jurisprudence
which deals with the common law suspended sentence is to be applied to the statutory
suspended sentence, it maynot have sufficient regard to the extensive discretionarypowers
nowconferred under Section 99 (10) to disregard breaches but more importantly, to allow
for a reduction in the custody sentence having regard to all the circumstances and in the
interests of justice. This discretion to reduce the custodial period was not permissible
under the common law suspended sentence (People (DPP) –v- Ian Stewart unreported
Court of Criminal Appeal 18 th March 2004). Unlike the legislative provisions made in
Northern Ireland and elsewhere to specificallyprovide for a separate and distinct period of
suspension of the sentence, Section 99 (1) and (2) are silent or at best confusing on this
issue. Section 99 (2) refers to a basic condition that the offender keeps the peace and be
of good behaviour “during the period of suspension of the sentence concerned” but does
not limit this period to the period of custody which is suspended. Moreover, Section 99
(1) provides for the power to suspend the custodial sentence “subject to the person
entering into a recognizance to complywith the conditions of, or imposed in, in relation to
the order”. Arguably, such a condition might specify compliance by the offender with
conditions such as a condition to take drug treatment for a specified period or to remain
away from the victim for a specified minimum period. Thus, the period of suspension
under Section 99 may be separately constructed upon the minimum periods specified in
the recognizance for compliance with the order of suspended sentence. As noted in
chapter 6, most of the judges believed that they had the power to suspend a custodial
sentence in excess of the custodial period. Indeed, Keane C.J. in Hogan’s case (Supra) was
careful on this point to state that there are no hard andfast rules applicable.
165 which periodhas been observed in other jurisdictions as longer in practice than immediatelyimposedsentences (OathamandSimon 1972, Tait 1995, Sparks 1971:389).
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