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Although Section 50 (2) seeks to limit the maximum period during which a suspended
sentence may be enforced, conceivably it would have been possible to construct a
suspended sentence under Section 50(2) which was suspended for exactly the same period
as the custodial period but which was in excess of 3 years. In those circumstances a
sentence would have been unenforceable but nonetheless valid. Thus a limitation upon the
period of enforcement may not necessarily be equivalent or co-terminous with the
limitation upon the period of suspension.
Section 99 also liberates a suspended sentence made in the District Court from the
strictures of a six month time limitation of enforceability under Order 25 Rule 4 of the
District Court Rules 1997. This comes about as a result of the absence within the section
of anyspecific reference to the District Court being governed bydifferent procedural rules.
The 1948 and 1967 District Court Rules, as noted in chapter 6 limit the enforcement of the
suspended sentence to within 6 months of the order or within 6 months from the date for
the fulfilment of a condition within the order respectively. Osborough (1982) correctly
identified this as a substantive issue hidden within a procedural rule, as the rules making
committee are empowered onlyto prescribe procedural rules and forms. However, under
Section 99 the District Court is no different from any other court exercising criminal
jurisdiction and any attempt to limit the enforceability of its orders by a rules making
committee must be considered ultra vires the Act and would not be permissible. When
writing earlier, O’Malley (2000:295) had expressed approval for the extension of a time
limitation for all courts upon the enforceability of a suspended sentence as similarly
provided for in the District Court Rules 1997. Moreover, this was further advocated by
the Whitaker Committee in 1985 and the Law Reform Commission in 1996 when they
urged the enactment of provisions similar to those contained in the 1967 Criminal Justice
Bill (Sec 50). These recommendations to place a time limit upon the enforceability of a
suspended sentence are noticeablyabsent in the statutoryarrangement containedin Section
99.
Another time element of the newsuspended sentence may be identified in the procedures
prescribed for revocation of the suspension of the sentence. Section 99(9) provides that
minimum term of imprisonment (Section 15(a) Misuse of Drugs Act 1978-2006. Clearly, the legislature could have provided a maximum period for the operation of a suspended
sentence but failedon this occasion to do so. Thus, the courts have averywide discretion when constructingthe operative period.
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