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Imposition of Fine and Deferment of Sentence
Section 100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2006 introduces a newconcept where the sentence
may be pronounced and then deferred for a period, but the sentence must also be
accompanied by the imposition of a fine. While the imposition of a fine is a condition
precedent to the use of the deferred penalty under Section 100, the level of fine is not
defined and it is argued that such a fine might well be fixed at a nominal level merely to
allowthe use of the deferredpenaltyunder Section 100.
Consistent with the statutory suspended sentence under Section 99, the deferment of
penalty as provided for in Section 100 does not displace by way of a statutory amendment
the previous power of the courts to defer the issuance of a warrant conditionally upon the
offender not receiving a further conviction within a specified period. Thus it would
appear, in the absence of such provision to abolish the common law sentencing practice,
particularly in the District Court, there now emerges two distinct deferment of penalty
procedures. The new statutory process is quite circumscribed by time limits and is
conditional upon the consent of the accused, whereas the common lawprocedure does not
require a consent of the accused to be given prior to the deferment of the sentence and is
not limited bya six month rule where the order of sentence cannot be made “later than six
months after the making of the order”. As noted in chapter 6, the District Court
frequently makes a hybrid deferred sentence/suspended sentence by specifying that the
sentence of custody is not to be served by virtue of the warrant of execution being
withheld, provided the accused does not receive a further conviction within a specified
period e.g. two years. No consent is called for in this procedure and the time limit for the
suspension of the sentence or the deferral of the sentence is not limited even by the
District Court Rules, Order 25 Rule 3 and 4. In all other respects the operational structure
of Section 100 is similar to the statutorysuspended sentence in Section 99.
But what can the legislative intention be in introducing Section 100 of the Criminal Justice
Act 2006, especially as no provision has been made to abolish the prior inherent
jurisdiction exercised to defer penalty? The necessity to combine the procedure with the
imposition of a fine seems to import an element of extra punishment if the procedure is to
be used at all, although as mentioned, this can be circumvented by the imposition of
nominal fines in combination with the deferment of sentence. The statutory procedure
for deferral of sentence introduces two further restrictions in the guise of a necessaryprior
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