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On a literal interpretation, the Oireachtas confers a power upon a court exercising any
criminal jurisdiction to suspend the execution of a sentence of imprisonment. Such power
to suspend a term of imprisonment is conditional upon the accused entering into a
recognisance to abide byconditions contained in the recognisance. Such recognisance at a
minimum must contain a condition that the accused will keep the peace and be of good
behaviour during the period of the suspension for the whole period of the sentence
including the custodial part of the sentence, if the sentence is partly suspended (Section
99(2)).
A sentence of imprisonment must first be imposed before the court may suspend the
sentence under Section 99(1). In the analysis in chapters 5 and 6 it was noted how this
somewhat open-ended wording was subsequently modified and circumscribed in the
jurisdiction of England and Wales. First, the O’Keefe principles were incorporated into the
1973 Criminal Justice Act to limit the application of the suspended sentence to genuine
custodial cases only. Secondly the application of suspended sentences was further limited
to exceptional cases only under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 in that jurisdiction. The
writer has argued in chapter 6 that under the common lawsystem the courts in Ireland use
the suspended sentence widely and in circumstances where the court may not have
intended to cause the immediate incarceration of the convicted offender. A suspended
sentence for example may be imposed in circumstances where imprisonment was not
considered, to cause that person to adopt practices in his/her lifestyle specified as
conditions in the recognisance that would deter the offender from further offending at
least for the periodof the suspension of the sentence.
One judge characterised this feature of the suspended sentence in the interviews as follows:
“I felt I wasn’t quite there yet and I gave him a suspended sentence…if a guy came back to me on
another charge and was convicted, the next time he was practically guaranteed a prison
sentence”.A4J5DC
Section 99(1) continues the requirement that a person must firstly be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment (Osborough 1992:222) before a sentence may be suspended. In this
respect the formal initial sentence to imprisonment appears similar. However, as observed
in the preceding chapters, the O’Keefe principles have not been incorporated into Irish case
law. Had such incorporation occurred this would have significantly shifted the rationale
for the suspended sentence much more closelyto a position directlylinking the suspended
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