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consent of the accused and a fixed period for the maximum period of deferral. Although
O’Malley (2000:317) did advocate a maximum period during which a sentence could be
deferred at one year, it is difficult to discern why six months was finally decided upon as
the maximum time limit. The suspicion arises that the draftsman may have had the
restrictions imposed in the District Court Rules in mind when s/he fixed upon the six
month period for the maximum time limit for the making of a custodial sentence under
Section 100. The new statutory deferred penalty also possibly introduces an unnecessary
extra hearing of the sentencing issue by obliging the court to put the case in for further
hearing, at least one month prior to the date specified for the imposition of the custodial
sentence. In the common law procedure used to date, it is not necessary to re-enter a
deferred sentence unless there is a breach, and where such breach is complained of by the
prosecution, a warrant may issue to bring the offender back to court to show cause why
such original sentences should not be imposed. When the order is reviewed under Section
100(5), if the court is satisfied that the person has complied with the conditions specified in
the order, the court shall:-
“…not impose the sentence that it proposed to impose when making that order
and shall discharge the person forthwith (Section 100(11) Criminal Justice Act
2006).
But what is the status of the original order and conviction if the person is “discharged” and
has paid a fine in consequence of a conviction? It would appear that a “discharge” in this
context is substantively different from the type of discharge contemplated under Section
1(1)(a) of the Probation of Offenders Act 1908. Arguably, the offender is merely
discharged from a custodial sentence but not discharged from a conviction particularly
when a fine has been paid. The necessity to re-enter the case for the consideration of
imposing the deferred penaltyat a maximum of five months from the making of the order,
suggests the sanction is designed for use almost exclusively in the District Court as the
Circuit Criminal Court may not sit in a venue which imposes a deferred sentence in many
provincial locations within a six month period of one sitting and the next. Although the
designation of “court” is not specified, the limited time span allowed for such procedures
suggest it is designed for courts of summary jurisdiction only. If this interpretation is
correct does Section 99, which deals with suspended sentence, apply only to courts
following trial on indictment? Again the definition of “court” is not limited to such latter
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