(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica

occur in these regions.” 232 However, it is in fact very difficult to know with precision
where biofuel and biofuel feedstocks are imported from, and it is very likely that the
quantity and origin of biofuel imports will sensibly change over the coming
months and years to reflect new investments – especially in Africa – motivated by the
RED. As highlighted in the cases above (section 4), the current actual agrofuels
production in Africa (and its related export to Europe) cannot be used as a realistic
measure of the role of biofuels in land grabbing. In fact, the situation evolves rapidly,
and between January and December 2010, Egypt and Sudan were among the top
ten ethanol importers of ethanol in the EU. 233
Moreover, and this is a central point, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to
assess what is the exact impact of the EU biofuel consumption on imports from
Africa because the trade chains can be very complex. Biofuel feedstock may for
instance be imported already processed in liquid fuel, or in the state of raw material.
Decisions about the final use of a commodity can be made at the last moment, often
making it almost impossible to differentiate between investments going to fuel and food
markets. 234 The French Cour des comptes equally notes that because of customs’
rules and EU state practices, there is in fact a limited controls of biofuel or biofuel
feedstocks imports from third countries, and it is difficult to track those imports. 235 The
EU assessment of the prospects for agricultural markets indicates 1) that growing
demand for maize will be partially due to the expanding use for ethanol production,
and 2) that the EU will remain a considerable importer of maize over the period until
2020 because of this demand. 236 It appears therefore that a significant part of the
maize that is imported is likely to be used to meet the growing EU ethanol
consumption. Moreover, some biofuels are sometimes formally imported from one
country, like the USA, but in fact produced in another one. 237 And even more complex
to evaluate, biofuels imported to the EU may be made out of feedstocks that come
from third countries. Additional trade combinations can be made. In a report to the
European Commission, the authors admit for example that, in cases of sugar cane
produced using child and forced labour, they are not sure whether this sugar cane is
used for EU biofuels. 238 Thus, even when biofuel and biofuel feedstocks trade statistics
exist, they are very difficult to analyse precisely, and they need to be combined with
other sources of data and qualitative analysis.
In any case, the EU has not set up any mechanism to ensure that it does not
import biofuels or biofuel feedstock from Africa, or even that its policy does not
generate land grabbing. Faced with the growing evidence of land grabbing cases
linked to its biofuel policy, argumentation based on data about current imports does
not hold.
5.2.3. Affecting the land rush for other commodities, including food
In any case, would the EU only produce biofuels on its own territory, it would still have
an effect on land grabbing in Africa. This point is often forgotten, though it is
fundamental: even agrofuels produced in the EU affect land grabbing in Africa,
through the so-called Indirect Land Use Change (ILUC) effect (see 6.6 below). It takes
place when food crops in the EU are converted to biofuel feedstock production; the
food that used to be grown then has to be produced somewhere else. This effect is
sometimes broken down into:
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