(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica

The EU, in response, has constructed a narrative according to which agrofuels are
produced on so-called “marginal” or “degraded” land, rather than good quality
land. 284 However, it has been demonstrated several times that much of the land
considered as “idle” frequently constitutes a vital source of food and livelihood for poor
people by providing fruits, herbs, wood for example for heating or grazing area. 285 In
addition, agricultural producers often choose better quality lands, as recognised by
some EU staff members, 286 since production on marginal land has proven to not be
economically viable. 287 Additionally, considering that the EU biofuel policy only or
mainly affects “marginal” lands would be ignoring the “ILUC effect” of agrofuels,
whereby biofuel production on food crops in rich countries leads, to compensate, to
food production for export in developing countries. Such export food crops do need,
without a doubt, good quality fertile land. In addition to this, case studies – including
the ones presented in part 4 – provide evidence that all too often large-scale agrofuel
projects are not carried out on “marginal” or “degraded lands”, but rather in the most
fertile areas. Take, as an example, the Markala Sugar Project in Mali that is being
carried out in an area – namely the Office du Niger – whose irrigated lands were
supposed to contribute to the country’s food security and self-sufficiency.
Some policy makers have argued that if African countries are not able to produce the
food they need to feed their population, they can import it. Firstly, it should be noted
that so far, the trade system has not been able to provide for enough food for countries
that need it. Thus, while approximately 9% of cultivated land is associated with net
exports of agricultural commodities from developed to developing countries; the latter
are still food insecure. 288 Secondly, in addition to not working, growing dependency on
food imports, in particular for African countries which have enough resources to
sustain themselves, raises important issues in terms of food sovereignty such as the
right of people to define their own food and agricultural policies, putting at the core of
the discussion who produces food, for whom and how. Thirdly, trade and food imports
are simply not a solution because poor people cannot afford it, as it will be seen.
6.1.2. Not able to buy food
Agrofuels affect the economic accessibility of food, and many poor people in African
countries could be unable to adequately feed themselves as a consequence of the EU
biofuel policy. This is, in the first place, a direct consequence of the increase in
food prices generated by biofuel policies. A number of studies show that developing
countries, particularly in Africa, were the most affected by this price rise. 289 And it also
affects the poorest people in Africa. While at first sight one might assume that higher
food prices are beneficial to small farmers, poor rural household usually are in fact net
food buyers and high and volatile food prices often has a devastating effect on them. 290
In addition, food prices tend to be “stickier” than global commodity agricultural prices:
food prices go up on local markets when global commodity prices rise, but they do not
decrease when the global prices go back down. 291 As a result, studies claim that, due
to agrofuels, calories consumed in Sub-Saharan Africa could decrease by 4% by 2020,
and between 5 and 20 million people could suffer from food insecurity in Africa. 292
Again, it is not only the production of agrofuels in Africa that has negative effects, but
its uncontrolled and unplanned development worldwide. Hence, “the impacts on food
prices as a result of bioenergy developments elsewhere may be much more important
and potentially harmful, especially to the many food-deficit countries in Africa”. 293 It
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