(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
places new pressures on agricultural markets, which are<br />
characterized by temporal restrictions (the time it takes to<br />
increase production), limited resources (land, water, and<br />
nutrients), and growing demand driven by demographic and<br />
income increases. In addition to magnifying the tensions<br />
between supply and demand, the rigidity of biofuel mandates<br />
exacerbates price fluctuations and magnifies global price<br />
volatility. Last but not least, biofuels gradually increase the link<br />
between energy markets (which are highly volatile) and food<br />
markets (also volatile), further increasing the volatility of the<br />
latter. 276<br />
6.1.1. Less food available<br />
The impact of agrofuels on food prices tends to show that biofuel production reduces<br />
the amount of food available. The fact that the EU biofuel policy makes food less<br />
available can be explained with different arguments.<br />
The impact of agrofuel production on the availability of food is the most obvious when<br />
food crops – in particular crops for local consumptions – are replaced by biofuel crops,<br />
or other food crops for export (see the case studies in part 4, especially the Markala<br />
Sugar Project in the Office du Niger in Mali or the agrofuels projects in the Tana River<br />
area in Kenya). In this case, the region where it takes place mechanically has less<br />
food available, unless it imports more from abroad the region. The problem with<br />
moving from short-circuits of self-reliance to dependence on distant market distribution<br />
systems in the current context of food price volatility will be explained later. Agrofuels<br />
can also directly impact the availability of food in a country that is not food selfsufficient<br />
by encouraging the development of export or biofuel crops on free fertile<br />
land, instead of food crops.<br />
These effects are worsened by two factors. First, biofuel policies promote an industrial<br />
farming model, whereas it has been proven and emphasised many times that the most<br />
efficient and most sustainable way to address food insecurity in Africa is to promote<br />
small-scale farming, which tends to be more productive, more redistributive, and more<br />
sustainable. 277 It is for this reason for instance that the EU considers that “sustainable<br />
small-scale food production should be the focus of EU assistance to increase<br />
availability of food in developing countries.” 278<br />
Yet, it is striking to note that agrofuels are produced and/or planned to be<br />
produced in some of the most food insecure countries in Africa. For instance, in<br />
Mozambique, where approximately 35% of households are chronically food insecure, a<br />
mere 32,000 hectares out of the 433,000 approved for agriculture investment between<br />
2007 and 2009 were for food crops, reflecting a lack of strategies to ensure that<br />
energy and food investments by other countries do not override agricultural interests of<br />
grassroots communities. 279 The case studies presented in this report suggest the<br />
same. And the contracts signed by the investors generally do not provide any<br />
protection of the right to food. Amongst the twelve large-scale land deals reviewed by<br />
the IIED, most of them appear to not create any safeguard to ensure that local food<br />
security needs are met, allowing unlimited and unrestricted exports when food is<br />
produced. 280<br />
62