(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
(Bio)Fueling Injustice? - Europafrica
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5.2.4. Making land a bankable investment<br />
The EU biofuel policy also drives land grabbing in a more indirect but still pernicious<br />
way by pulling up the value of the land and making it a bankable investment. It<br />
has been pointed out in many reports that a significant part of land grabbing is due to<br />
“land banking” – whereby investments in land are made not to produce crops but to<br />
speculate with the prospect of a juicy future added value. As a French government<br />
advisory body put it, “policies promoting agrofuels in developed or emerging countries,<br />
with a mandatory percentage of these new fuels going to distributors, led to the<br />
appearance of rents.” 249 Some investors have acquired land in quantities much larger<br />
that they could use with a view of locking favourable terms and eliminating future<br />
competition. 250 By setting mandatory targets and massively subsidising biofuels, the<br />
EU creates a “heavily distorted biofuel market” and thereby an artificial land market. 251<br />
The EU thus incentives biofuel development both in the EU and in the global South. 252<br />
While giving predictability to investors, it artificially drives up the price of the<br />
commodities (land and feedstock) necessary to produce biofuels and it gives<br />
confidence for investments in land, including for purely speculative purposes. 253<br />
In this context several companies based in the EU have found the necessary<br />
confidence and support to grab hundreds of thousands of hectares of African<br />
land. A report commissioned by Committee on Development of the European<br />
Parliament finds that as a consequence of the ambitious EU biofuel target, securing<br />
land for the production of energy crops in countries where land prices are low has<br />
become an attractive business investment. 254 And whether it is to export to EU<br />
Member States or to other countries does not matter, it is still a consequence of the<br />
momentum generated by the EU policies, and, the EU and EU Member States are<br />
responsible for the way their companies act abroad (see section 8.2.2).<br />
5.3. Imposing an export industrial farming model on the<br />
pressure of the agroindustry<br />
The EU biofuel policy thus clearly drives land grabbing, using all the components of its<br />
policy related to biofuels approach. Doing so, it imposes an export industrial farming<br />
model which creates one of the worst forms of land grabbing.<br />
Notably because it is focused on quantitative objectives, placing priority on<br />
technological and market-based solutions, the EU biofuel policy tends to promote<br />
large scale industrial exploitations. 255 In the words of the former UN Special<br />
Rapporteur on the right to food, “the greatest risk is that dependence on the agroindustrial<br />
model of production will fail to benefit poor peasant farmers and will generate<br />
violations of the right to food”. 256 Evidence indicates that agrofuel production in<br />
particular requires more capital intensive farming, which favours large agricultural<br />
producers who are better connected to the markets. 257 The HLPE notes that “the bioenergy<br />
market tends to promote large industrial plantations with efficient crop handling<br />
and processing”. 258 This is also because economy of scale is key to profitable biofuel<br />
production, and biofuel production involving smallholders does not seem to be, at least<br />
for the moment, economically viable, 259 an analysis that is supported by pro-biofuel<br />
studies. 260 In a book published by the World Bank in 2011, the author concludes a<br />
review of three biofuel case studies in Africa by affirming that investors need to reach<br />
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