Understanding global security - Peter Hough
Understanding global security - Peter Hough
Understanding global security - Peter Hough
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ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS TO SECURITY<br />
endangered by the fact that states continued to exploit or pollute them oblivious to<br />
the fact that the cumulative effect of this would eventually be their ruin or depletion<br />
(Hardin 1968).<br />
The Tragedy of the Commons concept became influential in the early 1970s<br />
with concerns that the economic <strong>security</strong> of the developed world could be imperilled<br />
by the earth as a whole exceeding its ‘carrying capacity’. One manifestation of this<br />
was the rise of international political action on population control (see Chapter 4),<br />
another was the popularization of the ‘limits to growth’ thesis which argued that<br />
increases in industrial production and economic growth in developed countries would<br />
have to be checked. Two very different solutions to the Tragedy of the Commons<br />
parable can be found. First, you could have informed collective management to<br />
regulate use of the village green for the benefit of all. Second, you could abandon<br />
the idea of common land and divide the green up into individual holdings in the<br />
expectation that each plotholder would graze sustainably, as it would be in their<br />
own interests to do so since the costs could not be externalized as before. At the<br />
<strong>global</strong> level both types of solutions are evident in the development in the 1970s of<br />
international law for a ‘commons’ already subject to many centuries of contention, the<br />
high seas. The ‘Common Heritage of Mankind’ principle agreed to at Stockholm<br />
was crystallized ten years later as part of the Third UN Conference on the Law of<br />
the Sea (UNCLOS III) with the agreement that deep seabed minerals would be the<br />
property of the International Seabed Authority. This form of collective management<br />
to sustain collective goods can be contrasted with the encroachment on the tradition<br />
of the ‘freedom of the seas’ by the huge growth of waters claimed by states in the<br />
legitimization at UNCLOS III of 200-mile ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’ (EEZs).<br />
Although EEZs, on the one hand, could easily be accounted for by a conventional<br />
Realist analysis of coastal states maximizing their power, the rationale offered for<br />
their creation was that fish stocks and other resources would be utilized more<br />
sustainably if under sovereign jurisdiction rather than subject to a ‘free-for-all’.<br />
The gradual appreciation of three other challenges posed by environmental<br />
change questions to conventional state-to-state relations since the mid-1980s has<br />
elevated this realm of international politics to a higher diplomatic level and securitized<br />
some of the issues.<br />
Localised environmental problems can<br />
become <strong>global</strong> problems<br />
Although transboundary pollution and the management of the <strong>global</strong> commons were,<br />
by the 1980s, firmly on the international political agenda, the majority of the harmful<br />
effects of environmental change seemed only to be felt locally and as such were of<br />
little concern to the international community. Domestic legislation in the developed<br />
world had banned the use of notoriously polluting chemicals like DDT and curbed<br />
the excesses of industrial emissions and waste disposal, leading to visible improvements<br />
in animal conservation and better standards of human health. However, the<br />
emergence of evidence that seemingly remote problems, experienced primarily in<br />
LDCs, had wider repercussions served to bring a number of new environmental<br />
issues to <strong>global</strong> political prominence.<br />
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