Understanding global security - Peter Hough

MILITARY THREATS TO SECURITY FROM STATES
imbalance will lead to global disorder. Many of the states just down the military
pecking order have no interest or desire to topple the USA, since that country does
not threaten them and they share many of its general aspirations for the world. Even
those among that ‘second tier’ of military powers not as closely aligned to the USA
as the UK, such as France and Russia, enjoy sufficiently strong ties to render war
unthinkable. US military hegemony has prompted adventurism that alarms much
of the world, such as in the 2003 war against Iraq, but George Bush Junior, for all his
faults, is not Napoleon or Hitler. The balance of power theory does still have some
applicability at the regional level, such as in the stand-off between India and Pakistan,
but when applied to the global political stage, is falsified by the much harder evidence
provided by the Kantian peace thesis.
Kantian peace also stands up well to the recent advance of the ‘Clash of
the Civilizations’ thesis. Russett and Oneal, for example, convincingly dismantle
Huntington’s theory by clearly demonstrating that no correlation can be shown
between recent conflicts and the apparent civilizational setting of the states concerned
(Russett and Oneal 2001: 239–270). Islamic and western states, on past evidence, are
no more likely to resort to war than any other combination of countries. Huntington
could contend that his thesis was a prediction for the future that can not be falsified
by empirical analysis of the past, but the speculative and sensationalist nature of his
writing stands in stark contrast to these Pluralists’ more rigorous, reasoned and
optimistic view of the way in which the world is likely to evolve.
The three peace prescriptions of Kant, and his proteges like Russett, appear to
have passed a number of trials but should not, however, be mistaken for panaceas.
Kantian peace does appear to account for the demise of inter-state war but its logic
does not explain the persistence of a number of civil wars. Democracy, trade and
common political institutions have not deterred Basque, Corse, Sikh or some Irish
nationalists from pursuing conflict to achieve their aims. In addition it is democracies,
including those not predisposed to fight themselves, who do much to fuel conflicts
in the undemocratic world through the lucrative trade in arms, usually justified on
the national interest grounds of economic expediency. In noting this, however,
neither can we conclude that Marxist economic determinism is the catch-all
explanation it purports to be, even for explicitly imperial wars. In invading the
Falkland Islands in 1982 the Argentinian junta were seeking to acquire a British
possession which had long been an economic burden to its colonial ruler. It was
symbolism which prompted the invasion and principle which prompted the campaign
to recapture the islands.
Theories need to change when they are no longer supported by the facts. The
balance of power has largely lost its applicability on the global stage. The clash of
the civilizations thesis has never had any since its proclamation. Even theories largely
supported by the facts need to be taken with a pinch of the Social Constructivist’s salt.
The ‘struggle for power’ shorthand of Realist analysis is not redundant, as evidenced
by the continued use of the ‘national interest’ justification of the unjust by many
governments, but it is in need of increasing qualification as time goes on. War is
still often considered a rational foreign policy choice for some governments but it is
not resorted to by others, even if there are tangible gains to be had from them doing
so. Germany has not risen again in a quest for military supremacy as much because
its government and people have never wished to as because of its containment. The
57