Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program Initial Evaluation Report

IDR representatives said that to date, the operational costs of the program have far
exceeded the revenue collected through payments from SSA. The discrepancy between
expenditures and revenues, they said, is in large part due to SSA’s inability to make timely
payments to IDR for the outcomes achieved by its clients. The low return on the initial
investment has made it difficult for IDR to raise additional capital from lending institutions
to expand program operations. IDR has found it necessary to restrict its efforts to serve
retail clients to no more than 25 percent of the caseload, and to stop serving SSI
beneficiaries altogether because the payments from SSA do not adequately meet the agency’s
up-front costs. Instead, IDR will concentrate its efforts on its long-term disability clients,
which will enable it to cover service costs with insurance payments. Any payments IDR
receives from SSA will be considered a “bonus.”
ABIL’s director recently described the program as “horrendously expensive.” The EN’s
business plan over-estimated demand and under-estimated the administrative difficulties and
related costs. The business plan projected more Ticket assignments and more placements.
ABIL has invested about $500,000 in the last two years and has filed claims for about
$50,000 in payments. ABIL has had to supplement TTW revenues with about $200,000 in
general operating funds. The director estimates that ABIL needs $227,000 in payments (on
behalf of about 100 Ticket holders) to continue operating. The interviewee stated that ABIL
will likely be willing to support the program for another 12 months, but participation in
TTW after that is doubtful if the program does not produce more revenue.
Representatives of Marriott’s Bridges program reported that program costs significantly
outweigh revenues, creating losses that they cannot absorb much longer. Although they had
originally viewed TTW as a five-year commitment, that estimate was based on higher
anticipated revenues; if revenues do not increase, their participation in TTW will have to be
discontinued.
The head of AAA TakeCharge said that, in general, administering TTW has involved
more work and brought far lower returns than originally anticipated. Indeed, she said,
despite her relatively low operating costs (TakeCharge has only two staff, both of whom
work part time), the business has been losing money so far. Despite being in the red, the
director plans to continue operating for the time being. She is close to her margin of
profitability, which requires that she receive five or six outcome payments each month. She
also feels an obligation to the Ticket holders whose Tickets she has accepted.
Oklahoma DRS officials estimated having spent about $1.2 million on services for the
575 beneficiaries it is serving as an EN under the milestone-outcome system, against just
$26,000 in TTW payments. They expect to eventually realize $250,000 to $500,000 per year
in Ticket payments, but it was unclear how this was expected to compare with future annual
costs. Officials there appeared unconcerned about Ticket program revenues, probably
because of the availability of other SVRA funding to pay for services.
Overall, the message is clear: all eight experienced providers we studied are experiencing
serious financial difficulties in operating under TTW—problems so serious that they may
not be able to continue functioning as TTW service providers, unless circumstances change
dramatically and relatively quickly or they can continue to draw on non-TTW revenue
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V: Case Studies of Eight Experienced TTW Providers