Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program Initial Evaluation Report

B.21
remained employed. 3 Because of this, staff were not overly concerned about the nature of
TTW’s payment structure. The company has always assumed the risk that some placements
will not be successful.
At the time of the initial interview, Glick and Glick had placed 31 Ticket clients in
employment and had begun to collect TTW payments. Interviewees noted that as many as
ten of their TTW clients had an interview or submitted a job application on any given day.
Staff indicated that it was still too early at first interview to determine whether a substantial
share of their TTW clients would experience success, however, they were optimistic. If the
trend were to continue, Glick and Glick expected to begin showing a profit in January 2003
– five months ahead of their original projections. At the initial interview, staff also indicated
that Glick and Glick had unassigned roughly 70 Tickets. Staff members believed that, unless
a client was motivated and actively pursuing employment, it was a waste of their time and
the client’s time for the Ticket to remain active.
At initial interview, staff did not anticipate significant problems tracking the
employment and earnings of TTW clients. The company’s experience with outcome-based
contracts had given its staff significant experience tracking employment for periods as long
as two years. Glick and Glick used the same tracking mechanisms it already had in place
under the outreach program, which involved aggressive pursuit of information, generally by
telephone, through both the employee and employers. Glick and Glick added a stipulation to
its contract with Ticket holders that required TTW clients to provide the necessary wage
documentation. Clients might also be asked to sign a release that allowed Glick and Glick to
obtain earnings information directly from employers. At initial interview, staff reported
experiencing few problems tracking earnings for employed TTW clients. On two occasions,
TTW clients had quit their jobs when asked for their pay stubs, because they feared losing
their benefits. Glick and Glick addressed this potential problem by revising its screening
process to emphasize that the goal of TTW was self-sufficiency, and by screening out
potential clients who feared losing cash benefits after going to work.
Program Administration. At initial interview, Glick and Glick interviewees noted few
problems administering TTW, but said a major administrative issue was the length of time it
took to receive TTW payments. Glick and Glick staff were originally told that it would take
60-90 days to receive payment. The firm’s experience had been that it took 90-120 days. The
Program Manager had not been able to provide Glick and Glick a clear explanation of why it
took so long to receive payment, even when all appropriate information had been submitted.
At initial interview, Glick and Glick interviewees thought they would have benefited
greatly if, prior to becoming an EN, they had spoken with other organizations that had
already implemented, or were in the process of implementing, TTW. Interviewees believed
that it would be beneficial for ENs to exchange ideas and teach each other how to address
3 Glick and Glick’s compensation can be tied to the ability of its employer client to
qualify for tax credits on the individuals recruited by Glick and Glick. An individual must
work 120 hours for the Work Opportunity Tax Credit, and 400 hours for a higher level
credit. The Welfare-to-Work tax credit is based on 400 hours of work.
Appendix B: Provider-Specific Case Study Summaries