Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program Initial Evaluation Report

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individuals in the AOI groups from participating in the TTW program under the new
payment options. Such screening is entirely consistent with the incentives established by the
program. ENs can only recoup the costs of serving Ticket holders and possibly make a
profit if the beneficiaries they serve succeed in the labor market. Specifically, beneficiaries
must achieve employment at levels that will generate a payment stream from SSA that
exceeds the costs of assisting them. For beneficiaries requiring high-cost services,
employment success means that they work full time at a job above minimum wage and
remain employed well past the point at which cash benefits go to zero. Thus, we expect
ENs to use various screening mechanisms to identify eligible beneficiaries who will (1) cost
relatively little to serve and (2) demonstrate the best chance of meeting their employment
goals.
Chapters III and V presented several examples of ENs’ screening practices intended to
identify the most promising candidates. Some ENs ask beneficiaries questions such as, “Are
you interested in full-time employment?” or “Are you interested in going off cash benefits?”
A “no” to either question might lead an EN to decide against serving a beneficiary. Such
screening questions clearly try to exclude members of the fourth AOI group—those who
want to work while continuing to receive partial cash benefits.
In addition to a beneficiary’s willingness to work full time and move off cash benefits,
ENs may consider several other factors in determining whether to accept an individual’s
Ticket. Given that a beneficiary must be in zero-cash benefits status for up to 60 months in
order for the EN to receive the maximum payment under either the outcome-only or
milestone-outcome payment system, some ENs hesitate to accept Tickets from beneficiaries
who may have difficulty maintaining employment for extended periods without intensive
ongoing supports. For example, some ENs have indicated reluctance to serve individuals
with cognitive or psychiatric disabilities, traumatic brain injuries, or other conditions that the
ENs perceive as decreasing the person’s odds of remaining in zero-cash benefits for a
substantial period. Such selectivity probably has its greatest impact on members of the first
AOI group, those with a need for ongoing supports and services.
Some ENs are also reluctant to accept Tickets from individuals in the second AOI
group, those perceived as needing high-cost accommodations. Beneficiaries who require
expensive assistive technology, for example, may have relatively more difficulty locating an
EN that will accept their Tickets. Because ENs appear to have difficult generating profits
from their Ticket activities, they are likely to be very reluctant to accept Tickets from
beneficiaries that may require above average resource to place on jobs (which could be the
case if the EN had to pay for an expensive accommodation) or that appear to have a below
average chance of obtaining employment (which could be the case if the EN thought
potential employers would have to pay for the accommodations). Thus, it is not surprising
that many ENs appear to target their services to beneficiaries whom they believe are able to
enter employment without requiring high-cost accommodations.
Some ENs also carefully consider a beneficiary’s educational history and employment
experience when deciding whether to accept a Ticket. Individuals whose work history is
exclusively or primarily limited to subminimum wage jobs—those in AOI group 3—may be
VI: Adequacy of Incentives Study