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Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program Initial Evaluation Report

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B.26<br />

have made <strong>the</strong> program so costly <strong>to</strong> operate that IDR can only afford <strong>to</strong> accept <strong>Ticket</strong>s from<br />

beneficiaries who it believes can be successfully placed with very low upfront costs. IDR has<br />

s<strong>to</strong>pped accepting <strong>Ticket</strong>s from SSI recipients al<strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r, because <strong>the</strong>y are <strong>to</strong>o costly <strong>to</strong> serve<br />

and because payment for services is lower. Screening procedures now attempt <strong>to</strong> identify<br />

SSDI <strong>Ticket</strong> holders viewed as “job ready”. IDR no longer provides vocational training or<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r costly upfront services, but focuses on resume development, interview and job seeking<br />

skills, and intensive job placement services <strong>to</strong> assist <strong>Ticket</strong> clients.<br />

IDR is currently in <strong>the</strong> process <strong>of</strong> shifting its outreach activities away from retail clients<br />

and <strong>to</strong>wards its long term disability <strong>Ticket</strong> holders and <strong>the</strong> beneficiaries recommended by<br />

vendors in its national network. Since January 2002, approximately 50% <strong>of</strong> <strong>Ticket</strong><br />

assignments have come from retail clients and <strong>the</strong> rest from clients on long-term disability.<br />

In <strong>the</strong> coming year, IDR estimates that <strong>the</strong> mix will shift <strong>to</strong> about 25% retail clients and 75%<br />

long-term disability clients.<br />

<strong>Ticket</strong> Assignments and Outcomes. IDR estimated at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> second<br />

interview that it has 137 <strong>Ticket</strong> assignments, and has received about $7,000 in payments for<br />

over a dozen beneficiaries. IDR is not actively unassigning large numbers <strong>of</strong> <strong>Ticket</strong>s but has<br />

unassigned <strong>the</strong> <strong>Ticket</strong>s <strong>of</strong> specific beneficiaries who did not follow through with activities<br />

specified in <strong>the</strong> IWP.<br />

IDR staff has not experienced significant problems actually serving <strong>Ticket</strong> holders. Staff<br />

members indicated that <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> recent economic downturn on job development and<br />

placement efforts has been negligible. For <strong>the</strong> most part, IDR feels it has been very<br />

successful in its job placement and employment retention efforts. The agency indicated that<br />

<strong>the</strong> services required by beneficiaries who are long-term disability cases are virtually identical<br />

<strong>to</strong> those needed by beneficiaries considered retail cases. The differences between <strong>the</strong> two<br />

groups primarily relate <strong>to</strong> available funding. For long-term disability clients, IDR is able <strong>to</strong><br />

receive funding from both an insurance company and SSA. In contrast, <strong>the</strong> agency must rely<br />

exclusively on payments from SSA when serving retail cases.<br />

Unlike many o<strong>the</strong>r ENs, IDR is still actively accepting <strong>Ticket</strong>s, but it has become much<br />

more selective in <strong>the</strong> number <strong>of</strong> <strong>Ticket</strong> assignments it accepts from retail clients. To date,<br />

<strong>the</strong> operational costs <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> program have far exceeded <strong>the</strong> revenue IDR collects through<br />

payments from SSA. The low return on <strong>the</strong> initial investment has made it difficult for IDR<br />

<strong>to</strong> raise additional capital from lending institutions <strong>to</strong> expand program operations. The<br />

insurance payments for serving long-term disability clients are used <strong>to</strong> meet its cash flow<br />

needs; IDR considers SSA payments a “bonus”. The decision <strong>to</strong> serve fewer retail cases is<br />

based on <strong>the</strong> financial risk involved in serving <strong>the</strong>se individuals, since IDR must rely entirely<br />

on SSA payments <strong>to</strong> <strong>of</strong>fset <strong>the</strong> costs <strong>of</strong> serving <strong>the</strong>se individuals. If <strong>the</strong> payment process<br />

does not change in <strong>the</strong> future, IDR may reluctantly s<strong>to</strong>p serving retail clients al<strong>to</strong>ge<strong>the</strong>r.<br />

<strong>Program</strong> Administration. IDR staff feels very strongly that problems in <strong>the</strong> current<br />

payment process continue <strong>to</strong> jeopardize <strong>the</strong> entire TTW program. One staff member said,<br />

“This one issue is putting <strong>the</strong> entire program at risk.” IDR estimates that it costs <strong>the</strong> agency<br />

$90-$120 <strong>to</strong> collect a $279 payment from SSA; approximately 40%-45% <strong>of</strong> program<br />

revenues are devoted <strong>to</strong> pursuing pay stub issues. <strong>Program</strong> participants are annoyed that <strong>the</strong>y<br />

Appendix B: Provider-Specific Case Study Summaries

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