Evaluation of the Ticket to Work Program Initial Evaluation Report

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system, said that even if payments were received promptly, they were simply too small to
cover costs. In addition to supporting larger payments, she advocated for two new payments
that would be made earlier than under the existing schemes: an initial payment upon
completion of an IWP, to cover initial staff costs, plus one upon initial job placement;
thereafter, the existing payment schedule could be followed. Additionally, she, as well as
other EN interviewees, disagreed with the requirement that beneficiaries must reach zerocash-benefits
status before outcome payments could be made on their behalf to an EN. Her
agency found that some clients were not able to sustain SGA consistently enough for EES
to receive regular payments; others did reach SGA, but continued to receive benefits for
several months during their trial work period. Glick and Glick representatives voiced the
same concern about the zero-benefits rule. They felt they deserved some payment for the
work they had done to get certain beneficiaries back to work, even though the individuals
were still receiving cash benefits. Marriott’s Bridges program officials, like the EES director,
felt that the payments (under both TTW payment systems) are too small to cover costs, a
problem which they predicted will make it difficult for TTW ever to succeed on a large scale.
These officials also expressed a desire for ENs to be allowed to select a payment system on a
client-by-client basis, more like the level of flexibility granted to SVRAs. This flexibility
would enable ENs to request outcome payments for clients who would more easily find
employment with wages over SGA, while recouping some payments for clients who were
not expected to quickly achieve this goal.
IDR thinks that the outcome payment system should be modified so that the payments
take place over a shorter period of time—three years, for example. That EN argued that if a
participant is still employed after three years, then he or she probably will remain employed
for an extended period of time. The length of the outcome payment plan creates a problem
when IDR is trying to raise capital. A bank considers payments expected 72 months in the
future to be unlikely to be paid. In addition, IDR would like to devote more resources to
serving SSI recipients, but feels that SSA needs to offer higher payments for them because
they require more resources to place and support in employment.
3. Concluding Observations on EN Financial Viability
It is difficult to disentangle, or rank the relative importance of, the many inter-related
factors that have contributed to these eight ENs’ financial troubles. What accounts for the
fact that expenditures have dramatically exceeded revenues, and what would be the ideal
solution to this problem? For each EN, the story may be slightly different. In general, these
ENs did not appear to have difficulty generating sufficient numbers of Ticket assignments.
Slightly more problematic was the difficulty some ENs experienced in getting clients to
move into employment at levels (in terms of income and duration) that would generate
milestone and outcome payments. While some interviewees cited the poor state of the
economy, Ticket holders’ skills and attitudes were also frequently cited. The latter issue
seems a bit surprising, especially in light of the fact that most of the ENs had screened
applicants to select those who appeared both willing to work and to require few services. A
few questions arise: Do ENs need better skills or more experience in identifying clients most
likely to succeed in the workforce? Or, do ENs have unrealistic expectations about being
able to place disability beneficiaries in jobs despite offering few and relatively non-intensive
V: Case Studies of Eight Experienced TTW Providers