Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: Educational Finance UNESCO-PROAP TA 2996-THA Education Management and Finance Study July 1999 all LEA's. The central government would have to set the policy for this standard level, the expenditure level judged necessary to provide an adequate education (subject to adjustment each budget cycle). Then, using the formula for each LEA's equalizing grant, the province would calculate the amount necessary to "top-up" each of its LEA's to the standard "adequate" level. The central government would then provide a fixed proportion of this equalizing amount to the province (say 80%), and the remainder would be derived from provincial resources. The central/provincial sharing ratio could also be adjusted to reflect the relative wealth of the province as well. 17 d. For example, suppose the standard for an adequate education is set at 100,000 Baht per student per year, 18 and the basic central subsidy is 50,000 Baht per student with an additional average of 30,000 Baht per student allocated as equalization subsidies. Consider two LEA's, one poor, one rich, who decide that they need only the 100,000 Baht per student for an adequate education. If the poor LEA's cost sharing percentage is low, the LEA would only have to raise, say, 5,000 Baht to receive another 45,000 from the provincial equalizing fund. For the rich LEA, the sharing proportion might be higher so that the rich LEA would have to raise 45,000 Baht in taxes, to receive a 5,000 Baht subsidy and raise the total to 100,000. (See Figure 23 below). Thus all LEA's have an incentive to raise local revenue to support education, but the equalizing portion of the finance system allows poorer schools to provide quality education although local resources are small. Figure 23 - Example of finance flows Poor LEA 5,000 Local tax revenue 35,000 Rich LEA 45,000 Equalizing Grant 15,000 50,000 50,000 Central Subsidy 17 The desired distribution of funds can be achieved through several kinds of allocation schemes or formulas. An example of an allocation method and formula are found in Appendix 7 18 The amounts used in this example are for illustration only and are not a recommendation about actual expenditure levels. 98
Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: Educational Finance UNESCO-PROAP TA 2996-THA Education Management and Finance Study July 1999 3.2.3.3. Incentives for local participation a. This approach to shared financial responsibility provides incentives for local education authorities, and through them the parents, to support their schools. The amount of local tax revenue they raise goes to their own schools. There is already considerable evidence that local communities and families in Thailand are willing to provide substantial financial support for their children's schooling (See section 2.3.1.1. above and Bray, 1994). This willingness should therefore be reflected in local decision making about budgets and taxation. b. This sort of taxation and finance system provides incentives for local communities to increase their support for the schools. If the taxation system is revised to provide such local autonomy, the result should be to increase the flow of resources into education. One incentive is a result of the equalizing effect of the sharing ratio, which means that lower income LEA's receive a larger benefit for each Baht of tax revenue they raise for schools. This should act as an effective incentive for the lower income communities. Since poor families already devote a substantial proportion of their income to education (Bray, 1994), it seems likely that they would be influenced by such an incentive structure. c. The financial and administrative authority that accompany such a finance system can operate as an incentive for wealthier communities to mobilize support for their schools as well. That is, the schools will likely be seen as belonging more to the communities and parents, and less to the central government. This ownership and enhanced ability to influence how resources are used would increase the willingness to increase support. While this principle is difficult to fully demonstrate with empirical research, it is a central feature in most reform arguments about both decentralization and financial structures (Patrinos and Ariasingam, 1997). 3.2.3.4 Capital financing a. The third revenue stream would be for special projects, quality improvement, and capital construction. The basic funding for these projects could be distributed through block grants from the central to the provincial level, using the same formula calculation as for the equalizing grants for basic education. Capital construction funds could continue to be provided from the central level, but there is a strong case to be made for using private capital markets. Provincial tax revenues can supplement the grants for quality improvement and related special projects as well. The distribution within provinces would be up to provincial-level criteria and decision processes, within guidelines set at the central level. b. A preferable alternative for capital construction costs would be to change the legal structures to allow provincial or certain forms of local governments (e.g., municipalities) to incur their own debt. With the authority to borrow directly from private capital markets, these LEA’s and governments could finance their own long-term capital projects, with the debt service payments included as part of the recurrent budget. Such a scheme has several advantages over the present one. It has the capacity to mobilize additional resources from the province and local 99
Page 1 and 2:
- Volume II/3 - Educational Finance
Page 3 and 4:
Table of Contents A. Executive Summ
Page 5 and 6:
Table of Tables Table 1 Adjustments
Page 7 and 8:
Figure 18 Figure 19 Figure 20 Figur
Page 9 and 10:
Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony.
Page 11 and 12:
Page 13 and 14:
Page 15 and 16:
Page 17 and 18:
Page 19 and 20:
Page 21 and 22:
Page 23 and 24:
Page 25 and 26:
Page 27 and 28:
Page 29 and 30:
Page 31 and 32:
Page 33 and 34:
Page 35 and 36:
Page 37 and 38:
Page 39 and 40:
Page 41 and 42:
Page 43 and 44:
Page 45 and 46:
Page 47 and 48:
Page 49 and 50:
Page 51 and 52:
Page 53 and 54:
Page 55 and 56: Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony.
Page 105: Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony.
Page 123 and 124: mission and operations. The term
Page 125 and 126: The information requirements for fi
Page 127 and 128: Table 1: Continued Dept. Flow of Re
Page 129 and 130: Table 1: Continued Dept. Flow of Re
Page 131 and 132: Description and assessment of compu
Page 133 and 134: Table 3: Existing computer systems
Page 135 and 136: Table 3: Continued Current existing
Page 137 and 138: Description of flows of financial i
Page 139 and 140: (teachers, facilities, etc) if data
Page 141 and 142: Table 4: Continued. Content of curr
Page 143 and 144: Table 5: Assessment of information
Page 145 and 146: An assessment of information system
Page 147 and 148: general administration, these syste
Page 149 and 150: Recommendation for IS Most involved
Page 151 and 152: 6. The nation wide implementation.
Page 153 and 154: References Office of the permanent
Page 155 and 156: Office of private education commiss
Page 157 and 158:
Interviews 10 September 1998, 9:00-
Page 159 and 160:
Appendix 2 Projections of Costs of
Page 161 and 162:
Projected Cost Increases for Expand
Page 163 and 164:
Identification of Schools for Sampl
Page 165 and 166:
8. Please place an X in a box below
Page 167 and 168:
enrollment as a whole growing at an
Page 169 and 170:
Figure 1: Thailand’s Development
Page 171 and 172:
Table 5: Crude transition rates of
Page 173 and 174:
and level of education, 1993 and 19
Page 175 and 176:
2.31 Questionable quality of educat
Page 177 and 178:
income inequality between agricultu
Page 179 and 180:
4.1.4. The percentages calculated f
Page 181 and 182:
Table 11: Public and Private sector
Page 183 and 184:
4.3.8. As would be expected, unempl
Page 185 and 186:
5.7 The dilemma is to balance the s
Page 187 and 188:
Table 14: Unemployment and Underemp
Page 189 and 190:
there any activities that would be
Page 191 and 192:
References Chalongphob Sussangkarn
Page 193 and 194:
Appendix 6 BMA Voucher Policy A. Lo
Page 195 and 196:
Appendix 7 Finance Allocation Metho
Page 197 and 198:
Appendix 8 Program Structure of the
Page 199 and 200:
Not all possible flows are show, si
Page 201 and 202:
Appendix 11 Results of Regression A
show all

Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?