Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok
Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok
Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok
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F<strong>in</strong>al Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: <strong>Educational</strong> <strong>F<strong>in</strong>ance</strong> <strong>UNESCO</strong>-PROAP TA 2996-THA<br />
Education Management and <strong>F<strong>in</strong>ance</strong> Study July 1999<br />
Figure 22 - Secondary school transition rates by region<br />
Secondary School Transition Rates by Region<br />
100.0<br />
95.0<br />
90.0<br />
Transition Rate (%)<br />
85.0<br />
80.0<br />
75.0<br />
70.0<br />
Tr. Rate L. Sec.<br />
Tr. Rate U. Sec.<br />
65.0<br />
60.0<br />
central northeast northern southern Total<br />
2.5 Student count allocation mechanisms: implications for equity<br />
and efficiency<br />
2.5.1 The Student Count Allocation concept<br />
a. Proposals for fund<strong>in</strong>g education through per head allocations to any school are<br />
usually based on two separate but related arguments. One is an efficiency<br />
argument: that provid<strong>in</strong>g parents and students with easily exercised choices<br />
among schools will <strong>in</strong>troduce or enhance a k<strong>in</strong>d of product market for school<strong>in</strong>g,<br />
with each supplier compet<strong>in</strong>g with the others for students as customers. In<br />
summary form, this argument holds that the competition for students <strong>in</strong> this<br />
market will lead schools to offer higher quality education and control costs, thus<br />
mak<strong>in</strong>g the system more efficient and effective. The other is an equity argument:<br />
that educational opportunity is <strong>in</strong>equitably distributed <strong>in</strong> the society, due primarily<br />
to large variations <strong>in</strong> parent’s ability to purchase high quality educational<br />
opportunities for their children. Richer parents can afford private schools, or to<br />
move or send their children to attend better public schools. Poorer parents cannot<br />
afford private schools and are less able to move or send their children to better<br />
public schools. Therefore children of poor families must attend whatever school is<br />
readily available, irrespective of its quality, thus restrict<strong>in</strong>g their educational<br />
opportunities. A f<strong>in</strong>ance system which supports public and private education<br />
equally has the effect of allow<strong>in</strong>g poor parents to “purchase” higher quality<br />
private education, thus improv<strong>in</strong>g their children’s educational opportunities, and<br />
<strong>in</strong>creas<strong>in</strong>g the overall equity <strong>in</strong> the system.<br />
b. While the equity and efficiency goals of such a scheme are certa<strong>in</strong>ly desirable,<br />
the scheme’s ability to produce such results requires careful analysis. The success<br />
of such a scheme depends <strong>in</strong> part on the validity of a large number of assumptions<br />
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