Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok

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Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: Educational Finance UNESCO-PROAP TA 2996-THA Education Management and Finance Study July 1999 and past spending patterns become institutionalized irrespective of their efficiency or appropriateness. 2.1.4.6. Teacher allocation a. Two problems in the distribution of teachers are related to the overall allocation of resources to schools and impacts of the financial crisis. These are shortages of teachers overall and maldistribution of teachers among schools. These distribution problems appear to be the result of a combination of financial and administrative policies, as well as consequences of financial pressures. The administrative policies are described briefly here, and examined in more detail in the report on decentralization and teacher reform. The financial issues receive more detailed attention. b. Teacher allocation among the provinces is handled for each type of school by their respective Departments in the MOE. For primary schools and ONPEC Pilot Schools the allocation of teachers to the provinces is decided in Bangkok by the Office of Teachers’ Civil Service Commission and ONPEC, using a per pupil formula. This formula is adjusted to accommodate particular policy or program needs. For the ONPEC Pilot Schools, for example, at least one secondary science teacher per school is specified, even if that results in a total number of teachers exceeding the formula calculation. A similar allocation process operates for the secondary schools under the Department of General Education (DGE). Teachers for DGE schools are allocated on the basis of a 1:25 teacher/student ratio. c. The allocation of teachers to schools within the province is the responsibility of the provincial offices. Allocation decision making differs between existing staff moving between buildings and assignment of new staff. For new staff, the number to which each ONPEC school is entitled is determined by the salary budget. However, ONPEC schools do not always receive the number of regular teachers that their salary budget would accommodate. In the Chiang Mai provincial office, the ONPEC administrators reported that the allocation from Bangkok is usually insufficient. In these cases, the provincial officers allocate the available teachers, in their words, to “best fit local needs.” The provincial office also attempts to hire temporary teachers to fill in where permanent teachers are not available. The Chiang Mai ONPEC office, for example, reported hiring 85 temporary teachers for the 1997-98 school year. For the DGE schools, the 25:1 ratio of students to teachers is the guide for allocations to schools. However this guideline cannot always be met, according to provincial officials, due to insufficient numbers of teachers in particular subjects. d. Transfers following initial assignments also affect the number of teachers available to each school. Teacher allocation is also effected through transfers, which are also managed at the provincial level. A teacher’s original assignment is for two years. After this initial period they may request a transfer. The requests are reviewed by a provincial-level committee, and approved when judged to be appropriate to the schools needs. This process is similar to that in the DGE secondary schools. 48
Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: Educational Finance UNESCO-PROAP TA 2996-THA Education Management and Finance Study July 1999 e. The management of teacher transfers at the provincial level is desirable from the point of view of decentralization, but it does involve problems as well. Existing policies give the provincial officers authority to adjust the allocation of teachers among the schools and to control transfers. Teachers moving into a province are initially assigned by provincial officials. So an initial assignment can be used to remedy shortages if sufficient teachers are available for assignment. However, after two years, teachers are allowed to transfer if the receiving school has an opening, or after one year if the teacher arranges for an exchange in positions with a teacher from the other school. These requests for transfers require approval by a committee at the provincial level. f. Using administrative controls to achieve equitable distribution of teachers is unlikely to produce the desired result. Provincial officials already have the nominal authority to achieve an equitable distribution or meet certain critical local needs. Since provincial officers are closer to the schools and more familiar with these circumstances, it is reasonable to locate some decision-making authority at that level of the system. However, these officials readily admit that maldistribution remains a serious problem. In exercising these administrative controls, they must balance the needs of particular schools with the demands of teachers for more desirable assignments. There can be considerable pressure from individual teachers to move to more desirable schools. The less desirable schools typically have poor facilities and living locations are also most likely to be remote, or high poverty, or otherwise disadvantaged. In some areas, such as the hill tribe regions, the remote school populations may include large concentrations of ethnic or language minority children. Such assignment may be very undesirable for teachers from other areas or backgrounds. If allocations and transfers are responsive to these teacher preferences, the result can reinforce and exacerbate already serious inequities. g. However, provincial officials cannot ignore teacher preferences either. A teacher that is unhappy with the working and living conditions is not likely to be very effective. Neither are large cultural differences between teachers and students conducive to effective instruction. For example, Chiang Mai provincial officers reported that Hill Tribe children often have difficulty understanding the accent of teachers from other regions. Moreover teachers required to work in undesirable locations are more likely to seek other employment and leave teaching as well. Therefore maintaining some balance of teacher preferences with school needs is necessary. What is needed are means to tip that balance in favor of the schools and children with the most pressing needs. h. Changes in the financial and budget policies may provide some leverage to tip the balance in the desired direction. Financial and budget arrangements can be used to provide greater incentives for teachers to work in otherwise less desirable schools. More provincial and local discretion over salary budgets could allow some schools to become more desirable by offering higher salaries or other financial incentives. Some provincial officials were skeptical that such incentives would have large effects. But since they have not been seriously attempted, such incentives may prove to have positive results. Provincial officials also reported that school principals deliberately compete for teachers by seeking donations and 49
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- Volume II/3 - Educational Finance
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Table of Contents A. Executive Summ
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Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony.
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mission and operations. The term
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The information requirements for fi
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Table 1: Continued Dept. Flow of Re
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Table 1: Continued Dept. Flow of Re
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Description and assessment of compu
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Table 3: Existing computer systems
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Table 3: Continued Current existing
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Description of flows of financial i
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(teachers, facilities, etc) if data
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Table 4: Continued. Content of curr
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Table 5: Assessment of information
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An assessment of information system
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general administration, these syste
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Recommendation for IS Most involved
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6. The nation wide implementation.
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References Office of the permanent
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Office of private education commiss
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Interviews 10 September 1998, 9:00-
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Appendix 2 Projections of Costs of
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Projected Cost Increases for Expand
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Identification of Schools for Sampl
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8. Please place an X in a box below
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enrollment as a whole growing at an
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Figure 1: Thailand’s Development
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Table 5: Crude transition rates of
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and level of education, 1993 and 19
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2.31 Questionable quality of educat
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income inequality between agricultu
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4.1.4. The percentages calculated f
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Table 11: Public and Private sector
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4.3.8. As would be expected, unempl
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5.7 The dilemma is to balance the s
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Table 14: Unemployment and Underemp
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there any activities that would be
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References Chalongphob Sussangkarn
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Appendix 6 BMA Voucher Policy A. Lo
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Appendix 7 Finance Allocation Metho
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Appendix 8 Program Structure of the
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Not all possible flows are show, si
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Appendix 11 Results of Regression A
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