Educational Finance in Thailand - UNESCO Bangkok

Final Report, Volume II/3 Anthony. Cresswell: Educational Finance UNESCO-PROAP TA 2996-THA
Education Management and Finance Study July 1999
e. The management of teacher transfers at the provincial level is desirable from
the point of view of decentralization, but it does involve problems as well.
Existing policies give the provincial officers authority to adjust the allocation of
teachers among the schools and to control transfers. Teachers moving into a
province are initially assigned by provincial officials. So an initial assignment can
be used to remedy shortages if sufficient teachers are available for assignment.
However, after two years, teachers are allowed to transfer if the receiving school
has an opening, or after one year if the teacher arranges for an exchange in
positions with a teacher from the other school. These requests for transfers require
approval by a committee at the provincial level.
f. Using administrative controls to achieve equitable distribution of teachers is
unlikely to produce the desired result. Provincial officials already have the
nominal authority to achieve an equitable distribution or meet certain critical local
needs. Since provincial officers are closer to the schools and more familiar with
these circumstances, it is reasonable to locate some decision-making authority at
that level of the system. However, these officials readily admit that
maldistribution remains a serious problem. In exercising these administrative
controls, they must balance the needs of particular schools with the demands of
teachers for more desirable assignments. There can be considerable pressure from
individual teachers to move to more desirable schools. The less desirable schools
typically have poor facilities and living locations are also most likely to be remote,
or high poverty, or otherwise disadvantaged. In some areas, such as the hill tribe
regions, the remote school populations may include large concentrations of ethnic
or language minority children. Such assignment may be very undesirable for
teachers from other areas or backgrounds. If allocations and transfers are
responsive to these teacher preferences, the result can reinforce and exacerbate
already serious inequities.
g. However, provincial officials cannot ignore teacher preferences either. A
teacher that is unhappy with the working and living conditions is not likely to be
very effective. Neither are large cultural differences between teachers and students
conducive to effective instruction. For example, Chiang Mai provincial officers
reported that Hill Tribe children often have difficulty understanding the accent of
teachers from other regions. Moreover teachers required to work in undesirable
locations are more likely to seek other employment and leave teaching as well.
Therefore maintaining some balance of teacher preferences with school needs is
necessary. What is needed are means to tip that balance in favor of the schools and
children with the most pressing needs.
h. Changes in the financial and budget policies may provide some leverage to tip
the balance in the desired direction. Financial and budget arrangements can be
used to provide greater incentives for teachers to work in otherwise less desirable
schools. More provincial and local discretion over salary budgets could allow
some schools to become more desirable by offering higher salaries or other
financial incentives. Some provincial officials were skeptical that such incentives
would have large effects. But since they have not been seriously attempted, such
incentives may prove to have positive results. Provincial officials also reported
that school principals deliberately compete for teachers by seeking donations and
49