Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS
Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS
Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS
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writing, a confidential report identifying the classified information and providing a justification why<br />
such information was omitted from the published report. 391<br />
Relevant Security Sector Legislation<br />
7. Kosovo Intelligence Agency<br />
The Kosovo Intelligence Agency (KIA) is established as an agency funded by the Kosovo Consolidated<br />
Budget and operates under the authority of the Prime Minister and the President of Kosovo. 392 It is<br />
subject to audits of the Auditor-General. The KIA Director is responsible for the lawful expenditure of<br />
funds granted to KIA. 393 Only in exceptional circumstances is he authorized to spend funds outside of<br />
the provisions of the law related to the expenditure of government funds. 394 Such exceptional<br />
circumstances are not clearly defined and the term itself is so vague that it potentially allows for abuse<br />
of such authority. The only control mechanism is the Prime Minister to whom the KIA Director has to<br />
submit an oral report immediately and a written report within 48 hours following the expenditure<br />
justifying the reasons for it. 395<br />
The KIA Inspector-General is responsible for providing an internal control function within KIA,<br />
including the review of activities of KIA and financial audits of its activities. 396 While the audit reports of<br />
the Inspector-General have to be submitted to both the Prime Minister and the KIA Director, the<br />
Inspector-General may recommend corrective actions only to the KIA Director and then monitor the<br />
progress made by the KIA Director on these proposed corrective actions. 397<br />
However, the KIA Director may prohibit the Inspector-General from initiating, carrying out or<br />
completing an inspection or audit if the KIA Director determines that this would be necessary to protect<br />
vital security interests of Kosovo. 398 This again might be again interpreted as a broad and vague<br />
provision, granting the KIA Director enormous discretion. In an institution, whose primary<br />
391 Ibid, Article 4.10.<br />
392 Law on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Articles 1.6 and 5.<br />
393 Ibid, , Article 41.1.<br />
394 Article 42.1<br />
395 Article 42.2<br />
396 Article 10.4<br />
397 Article 10.3<br />
398 Article 10.6<br />
102