Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS

The independence of the Auditor-General seems to be at risk because the current Auditor-General is
appointed by the International Civilian Representative (ICR) and because there seem to be no legal
remedies for the Auditor-General to appeal in the event that he/she is dismissed by the ICR. Similar to
the Ombudsperson, there is in general an inadequate follow-up on the recommendations and reports by
the Auditor-General, probably also because there are no sanctions provided if a public authority does
not comply with his recommendations. There is also very little discussion of the findings of the Auditor-
General in the Assembly of Kosovo, which indicates the low level of importance the Assembly attaches
to the reports of the Auditor-General. The relationship between the Auditor-General and the newly
established Supervisory Committee on Public Finances has still to be worked out, while it is not clear if
the current committee structure will continue to exist in the Assembly. The Auditor-General is also
exposed to insufficient allocation of resources and lack of Government support.
As in the case of the Ombudsperson, the operations of the Auditor-General in relation to the security
institutions may be compromised by legal requirements of classification of information and the
possibility (especially by the Kosovo Intelligence Agency) to influence the outcome of security clearance
procedures for officers of the Auditor Office. Other forms of possible Government interventions in the
operations of the Auditor-General, such as delayed publications of reports, “corrections” of reports and
pressure on his officers (even on his deputy Auditor-Generals) diminish the credibility of the Auditor-
General and may result in further disregard of its findings and recommendations especially by the
security sector.
The policy and legal framework governing the Anti-Corruption Agency is in place but its
implementation suffers from insufficient Government support. As in the cases of the Ombudsperson
and the Auditor-General, there is little follow up on the Agency’s reports. The weakest point, however,
is the unwillingness of the Public Prosecution to initiate criminal proceedings of cases investigated by
the Agency and submitted to them. Since the Agency has no power to initiate criminal proceedings on
its own, reliance on an unwilling Public Prosecution is the main element that renders the Agency
ineffective.
The general conclusion is that the independent bodies are still weak and lack the necessary government
support to effectively execute their functions. Without a change of attitude by the Government to refrain
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