Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS

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Intelligence Agency (KIA) to the Ombudsperson. 326 Persons affected by actions taken by KIA may address a complaint to the Ombudsperson and, at the same time, also file a lawsuit against the KIA before a court. Furthermore, the law states, that the KIA is obliged to develop rules and procedures on complaints, which must be developed in consultation with the Ombudsperson. 327 In contrast to other rules and regulations of KIA, these procedures and complaints are public and cannot be classified as confidential files. However, the laws regulating the KIA complaints mechanism are not entirely clear. The wording of the law could either mean that the KIA develops the rules, which the Ombudsperson then has to follow when a complaint is filed, or that the KIA has its own complaints mechanism, whose rules it has to develop in consultation with the Ombudsperson. The former option would raise serious concerns from a constitutional perspective, with regards to the independence of the Ombudsperson. If the KIA sets the rules, which the Ombudsperson has to follow when processing a complaint against KIA, then what if the KIA sets rules and procedures, which significantly might hinder or delay an effective processing of complaints and/or may not be compatible with the constitutional independence of the Ombudsperson? A possible interpretation of the law would, therefore, be, that the provisions of the law should be applied as meaning that the KIA has its own complaints procedures, developed in consultation with the Ombudsperson, whereas the Ombudsperson applies its own procedures when addressing a complaint against the KIA. As mentioned above, classified information will be protected anyway by special legislation and the Ombudsperson would already have to adapt its rules and procedures to it, so there is no need for the KIA to design specific rules and procedures just for the sake of protecting classified information. The affected person has therefore the possibility both of filing a complaint with KIA and with the Ombudsperson. Whenever a complaint is submitted to the KIA regarding its activities, it is the authority of the KIA Inspector-General to investigate it. 328 But the law is not clear as to who has the authority to make a final decision on the complaint. The wording of the law suggests that the Inspector-General, following his investigation of a complaint, recommends corrective actions to the KIA Director, 329 but leaves it to the discretion of the KIA Director to decide if and what kind of corrective action will be taken in the end. 326 Law No. 03/L-063 on the Kosovo Intelligence Agency, Article 39.2. 327 Ibid, Article 7.3 (xix) 328 Ibid, Article 10.7. 329 Ibid, , Article 10.3. 92
The provisions of the law, with regard to the KIA complaints procedures, are, therefore, very vague and open for interpretation. This will have to be settled in the KIA’s new rules on complaints. At present, however, there is no information confirming whether the KIA has indeed developed such rules, as so far nothing in this respect has been officially published by the KIA. 10. Kosovo Police There are two classes of actions by the Kosovo Police, which might be subject of a complaint, i.e. police actions that adversely affect third persons outside the Kosovo Police and police actions that affect Kosovo Police officers, with respect to their legal status and employment rights. Regarding police actions against third persons, the Kosovo Police Inspectorate is responsible for conducting investigations of alleged disciplinary offences committed by the General Director, the Deputy General Director, and any Assistant General Director, as well as serious disciplinary offences allegedly committed by any police officer. 330 The Police Inspectorate submits its findings to the Disciplinary Commission, which determines, on the basis of these findings, whether indeed a disciplinary offence was committed. 331 This Commission submits its conclusion to the Minister of Internal Affairs, who then orders disciplinary measures against the General Director, the Deputy General Director and any Assistant General Director of the Police 332 , Disciplinary measures against police officers who have committed a serious disciplinary offense are imposed by the General Director of the Police 333 . Disciplinary decisions of the Minister may be appealed to the court only, while disciplinary decisions of the Director General may be appealed to the Minister. 334 The Internal Affairs Unit of the Kosovo Police investigates minor disciplinary offenses committed by police officers and reports its findings to the Internal Police Disciplinary Commission. 335 A disciplinary decision is then taken by the Disciplinary Commission, which may be appealed to the police Appeals and Rewards Board. 336 Complaints of police officers regarding their status and employment rights are handled by the Police Appeals Board. 337 Both types of police actions may also be reviewed and investigated in parallel by the Ombudsperson, provided a compliant has been filed by an individual 330 Law on Police, Articles 44.1 and 45.1. 331 Ibid, , Articles 44.2 and 45.2. 332 Article 44.3 333 Article 45.3 334 Articles 44.3 and 45.4 335 Article 45.5 336 Article 45.6 337 Article 66.1 93
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Publikuar nga: Qendra Kosovare për
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PËRMBAJTJA Lista e shkurtesave ...
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PËRMBLEDHJA EKZEKUTIVE Kuvendi i K
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themeluara të Kosovës. Në të ka
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që kanë të bëjnë me qytetarët
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Popullit është që mund ta vë n
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ndjek Avokati i Popullit kur e proc
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keqpërdorim të autoritetit, p.sh.
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ngritura në këto raporte. 49 E dr
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AUDITORI I PËRGJITHSHËM Legjislac
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E fundit por jo më pak e rëndësi
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aportin konfidencial duke identifik
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publike të Republikës së Kosovë
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duhet të trajtohet si organizatë
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perceptimi i neglizhimit të raport
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AGJENCIA KUNDËR KORRUPSIONIT Legji
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ishikim të planit të veprimit nuk
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shprehet me faktin, që Institucion
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3. Të shtohet presioni mbi qeverin
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5. Agjencia Kundër Korrupsionit i.
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Rapori i Auditorit të Përgjithsh
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Page 46 and 47: SPISAK SKRAĆENICA COMKFOR Komandan
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Page 50 and 51: 5. Osnivanje Institucije Ombudsmana
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Page 60 and 61: Bez obzira na garancije nezavisnost
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Page 70 and 71: nedostatka reakcije Skupštine Koso
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Page 74 and 75: da preusmeri Agenciju i relevantne
Page 76 and 77: mnogi slučajevi kršenja ljudskih
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Page 80 and 81: VIII. Agencija za borbu protiv koru
Page 82 and 83: OEBS-ovo Saopštenje za javnost od
Page 84 and 85: Bojana Guzdic, Communication for So
Page 86 and 87: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS COMKFOR Comma
Page 88 and 89: therefore essential, that the indep
Page 90 and 91: standards, in particular the Europe
Page 92 and 93: legislation as to its compatibility
Page 96 and 97: with the Ombudsperson, as they cons
Page 98 and 99: It is interesting to note that once
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Page 102 and 103: y the President of Kosovo or one-th
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Page 106 and 107: person, when conducting a security
Page 108 and 109: Practice With respect to the securi
Page 110 and 111: The Auditor-General has previously
Page 112 and 113: functions independently from any ot
Page 114 and 115: EULEX Anti-Corruption Task Force, w
Page 116 and 117: The independence of the Auditor-Gen
Page 118 and 119: the respective public authority, a
Page 120 and 121: clear allocation of responsibility
Page 122: Report of the Auditor-General on th
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Indpendent Agencies Report - Alb, Ser, Eng.pdf - QKSS

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