Self-Esteem Research, Theory, and Practice Toward a Positive ...

58 SELF-ESTEEM RESEARCH, THEORY, AND PRACTICEmethod is that it “wins” no matter what the case may turn out to bebecause either outcome creates better understanding over time. In thissense, science can be seen as a great conversation to which anyone maycontribute at any time, regardless of gender, race, culture, or historicalperiod. Although perhaps in a different voice, phenomenologically orientedsocial scientists are legitimate participants in this great discussionbecause they follow the same rules of discourse. The presence of this perspectivealso is beneficial because it helps to keep the other more dominantperspective “honest” by reminding it that it is not capable of doingeverything, even in principle.Validity in Self-Esteem ResearchThe last set of difficulties generated by using the scientific method tostudy self-esteem, regardless of the paradigm being used, concerns thequestion of validity. Of course, this issue is a complex one and has beendealt with extensively in regard to self-esteem, especially by Wells andMarwell (1976) and Jackson (1984), who represent the quantitative andqualitative approaches, respectively. They concluded that validity is notso much a matter of absolute truth but of available proof. In other words,the value of the scientific method is not that it allows us to find hiddenanswers. Rather, it helps to eliminate possibilities and reduce uncertaintyto increasingly manageable levels (Tryon, 1991).Perhaps a better way of dealing with the concept of validity is to ask,as Jackson (1984) did, validity for what? If the goal of research, forinstance, is to measure self-esteem in a person, then the quantitativemethod is more valid because it is capable of dealing with such a task. If,however, we are interested in investigating aspects of phenomena as theyare lived by real people, then qualitative methods are more valid both inprinciple and in practice. Jackson talked about this situation in the followingway:Experimental investigation is based on the criteria of prediction andreplication. . . . But this is only one kind of criterion, and it establishesonly one kind of knowledge. There are other kinds of knowledge thatelude the criteria of prediction and replication; and a specific exampleis knowledge about self-esteem as a meaningful experience in aperson’s life. This kind of knowledge resides in a system of relationsthat is unique and irreducible in each separate instance. Such knowledgecannot be captured by a method that breaks it down into standardcomponents. The experiment, however, is designed to performexactly this kind of reduction. It is aimed at washing out the very informationwhich we seek—namely, information about unique and specificconstellations of personal meaning. (1984, pp. 216–217)