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Economic Report of the President

Report - The American Presidency Project

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tempt to set cartel rates would be disciplined by <strong>the</strong> freedom <strong>of</strong> anycarrier to set o<strong>the</strong>r rates. (This issue is less important for trucks, becauseinterline traffic is now less than 15 percent <strong>of</strong> total truck traffic,and complete freedom <strong>of</strong> routes would fur<strong>the</strong>r reduce such interlinetraffic. Interline rail traffic, however, is 48 percent <strong>of</strong> total rail traffic,and it is more important to maintain a process that economizes on<strong>the</strong> contracting costs for small interline shipments.) The alternativemay be an undesirable situation in which rail carriers refuse small interlineshipments, use trucks for shipments to points beyond <strong>the</strong>irroutes, or face an artificial incentive for mergers.The "Captive Shipper Problem"The "captive shipper problem'* is what initially led to rail rate regulation.This problem was substantially reduced by <strong>the</strong> development<strong>of</strong> alternative carriers and modes but has not been eliminated. Twodimensions <strong>of</strong> this problem, however, have sometimes been misunderstood.This relation is a bilateral monopoly. Both <strong>the</strong> rail carrierand <strong>the</strong> shipper have substantial bargaining power, and it is not clearthat this relation leads to rates that are generally "too high." Second,this relation does not lead to any long-term misallocation <strong>of</strong> resourcesas long as <strong>the</strong> price <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> shipped commodity is determinedin a competitive market. In any case, <strong>the</strong> sum <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> rents on rail andshipper property is constant. This inherent tension suggests that it isimportant to avoid any effective restraint on <strong>the</strong> common ownership<strong>of</strong> rail carriers and major shippers. One alternative may be to requirejoint track use by competing carriers. Ano<strong>the</strong>r alternative would beto index <strong>the</strong> rate bands now authorized for, say, ano<strong>the</strong>r decade andto terminate <strong>the</strong>se bands at that time. Unless this problem is resolved,however, some form <strong>of</strong> maximum rate regulation is likely tobe maintained in <strong>the</strong> rail industry.Restrictions on Multimodal OwnershipThere no longer appears to be any case for restrictions on multimodalownership. It is especially important to allow rail carriers toown trucking operations to facilitate container and piggyback traffic.A change in <strong>the</strong> law would be required to allow rail carriers to ownbarge lines. A change in <strong>the</strong> law would also be required to allowfreight-forwarders to own trucks, even though trucking companiesare now allowed to own freight-forwarders. The Bus RegulatoryReform Act <strong>of</strong> 1982 provides a substantially streamlined process forapproving intermodal mergers not prohibited by law.Restrictions on Route AbandonmentThe primary problem <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> railroads is excess route capacity, aproblem that reflects a combination <strong>of</strong> increased truck competitionand ICC restrictions on route abandonment. Some studies have indi-113

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