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Economic Report of the President

Report - The American Presidency Project

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able share in Japan and 56 percent <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> comparable share in WestGermany. No o<strong>the</strong>r major industrial nation devotes as small a fraction<strong>of</strong> total output to new investment as does <strong>the</strong> United States.TABLE 4-2.—Comparison <strong>of</strong> capital formation in six OECD countries, 1971-80[Percent]CountryGrossinvestmentInvestment as percent <strong>of</strong> GDPGross fixedinvestmentNet fixedinvestmentGrowth rate<strong>of</strong> outputper hour inmanufacturingFrance24.222.912.24.8Germany23.722.811.84.9Italy22.420.110.74.9Japan34.032.919.57.4United Kingdom..19.218.78.12.9United States19.118.46.62.5Source: Organization for <strong>Economic</strong> Cooperation and Development.It is instructive to compare <strong>the</strong> growth rates <strong>of</strong> productivity fordifferent countries with <strong>the</strong>ir shares <strong>of</strong> output devoted to new investment.Although productivity growth and investment rates are simultaneouslydetermined by a multitude <strong>of</strong> factors, it is striking that astrong positive relationship emerges. As shown in Chart 4-2, Japanhas both <strong>the</strong> highest investment share and <strong>the</strong> highest growth rate <strong>of</strong>productivity, while <strong>the</strong> United States has <strong>the</strong> worst investment performanceand <strong>the</strong> lowest growth rate <strong>of</strong> productivity.While <strong>the</strong> reasons for <strong>the</strong>se large international differences in rates<strong>of</strong> capital formation are not precisely understood, some evidencesuggests that <strong>the</strong> roots may lie in different public policies. AfterWorld War II, rebuilding <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> capital stock was a primary goal <strong>of</strong>economic policy in continental Europe and Japan. Governments inthose countries encouraged saving and investment and disregarded<strong>the</strong> early Keynesian fear that oversaving could reduce aggregatedemand and depress real economic activity.In contrast, <strong>of</strong>ficials in <strong>the</strong> United States feared a postwar relapseinto depression and avoided policies which would encourage saving.For example, some economists advocated sustained budget deficits asa means <strong>of</strong> absorbing excess private savings.It is now clear—on <strong>the</strong> basis <strong>of</strong> four decades <strong>of</strong> economic experiencesince <strong>the</strong> end <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Great Depression—that fears <strong>of</strong> secularstagnation caused by a high and rising saving rate are unwarranted.The much greater risk is that productivity growth in <strong>the</strong> UnitedStates will continue to stagnate at low levels, and that Americanworkers will have to accept a lower growth rate in <strong>the</strong>ir standard <strong>of</strong>81

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