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Economic Report of the President

Report - The American Presidency Project

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<strong>the</strong> United States will depress prices still fur<strong>the</strong>r. The belief that departuresfrom free trade are automatically called for if o<strong>the</strong>r countriesdo not play by <strong>the</strong> rules is a fallacy.Intervention in international trade by <strong>the</strong> U.S. Government, eventhough costly to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economy in <strong>the</strong> short run, may, however,be justified if it serves <strong>the</strong> strategic purpose <strong>of</strong> increasing <strong>the</strong> cost <strong>of</strong>interventionist policies by foreign governments. Thus, <strong>the</strong>re is a potentialrole for carefully targeted measures, explicitly temporary,aimed at convincing o<strong>the</strong>r countries to reduce <strong>the</strong>ir trade distortions.There are obvious risks in such a course <strong>of</strong> action. Instead <strong>of</strong> inducingo<strong>the</strong>r countries to move toward freer trade, U.S. pressuremight set <strong>of</strong>f a cycle <strong>of</strong> retaliation which would leave everyone worse<strong>of</strong>f. There are also domestic political risks. Trade measures intendedto be temporary may end up permanent and institutionalized. Theneed to balance <strong>the</strong> strategic objective <strong>of</strong> reducing foreign trade barriersagainst <strong>the</strong> harm which might be caused by U.S. retaliatorymeasures explains <strong>the</strong> U.S policy <strong>of</strong> negotiating for freer trade whileholding open <strong>the</strong> possibility <strong>of</strong> more direct action as a last resort.Responding to Problem IndustriesThe problems <strong>of</strong> industries which have recently lost <strong>the</strong>ir traditionalmarket power also pose a serious policy dilemma. There is strongpressure to give <strong>the</strong>se industries at least temporary relief from imports,in <strong>the</strong> hope that lower wage and price increases and improvedproductivity will eventually make <strong>the</strong>m competitive again. On <strong>the</strong>o<strong>the</strong>r hand, protection reduces <strong>the</strong> incentives for both firms andworkers to make <strong>the</strong>se changes. Fur<strong>the</strong>rmore, protectionist measures,however temporary <strong>the</strong>y are supposed to be, tend to become permanent.The limitation <strong>of</strong> protection for <strong>the</strong>se problem industries is acentral goal <strong>of</strong> U.S. economic policy.EXCHANGE RATES AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTSDuring 1982 <strong>the</strong> dollar rose against o<strong>the</strong>r major currencies to itshighest level since <strong>the</strong> beginning <strong>of</strong> floating exchange rates in 1973.The strength <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> dollar provided some benefits to <strong>the</strong> U.S. economyby reducing import prices and thus accelerating progress againstinflation. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand, <strong>the</strong> strong dollar caused severe problemsby decreasing <strong>the</strong> cost competitiveness <strong>of</strong> exported U.S. goods.CAUSES OF THE DOLLAR'S STRENGTHExchange-rate movements are not well understood. Econometricmodels <strong>of</strong> exchange-rate determination proposed in <strong>the</strong> past decadehave not shown any consistent ability to track past exchange-ratemovements, let alone predict future changes. Never<strong>the</strong>less, careful61

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