kidnapping, of Maria Edith de Debernardi. Publicly, a one-million-dollar ransom was reportedlypaid for her release, although rumors are that the amount was much greater. 14 After this kidnappingmany of the members of Patria Libre were rounded up by the police, including Juan Arrom. However,several protest marches were held in Asuncion resulted in the release <strong>and</strong> self exile of Arrom <strong>and</strong>others to Brazil. 15However, this didn’t stop Patria Libre which, buoyed by their success, turned again to FARC.A July 3, 2003 e-mail message found on the computer of celebrated FARC comm<strong>and</strong>er Raul Reyesreferred to three to five “Paraguayans from Patria Libre, with whom we have done some financialjobs in their country,” <strong>and</strong> who would be arriving on July 20 for a training course. 16 In addition atleast one FARC adviser, Orley Jurado Palomino, aka Comm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago, was sent to Paraguay toprovide training, advice <strong>and</strong> operational leadership. He remained with Patria Libre in Paraguay fornearly a year. 17Comm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago initially trained members of the group in the mountains <strong>and</strong> hills of Finap,Capiibary, <strong>and</strong> Caaguazu in southeastern Paraguay. 18 Detected by local authorities, the EPP thenmoved back north to its’ home territory around Concepcion. Here the group began training for amajor kidnapping operation. A video captured in July 2004 shows members of the group rehearsingfor the operation. The methods observed in the video are those of professional kidnappers designedto insure maximum efficiency <strong>and</strong> ruthlessness in minimal time. 19 The capture of the video didn’tslow down preparations for the operation in part because the Paraguayan authorities thought it wasthe training video for the already completed Debernardi case <strong>and</strong> so failed to act.Trained by the FARC; Mistaken for Drug TraffickersComm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago’s apparent liaison to the FARC was Rodrigo Gr<strong>and</strong>a, the Colombians’representative in Venezuela. A captured e-mail from Gr<strong>and</strong>a to Raul Reyes, a member of the FARCSecretariat, indicated that preparations were advancing: “The economic objective is ready. They havethe intelligence, weapons, cars, houses, <strong>and</strong> the group to carry out the operation. They’re looking toget 5 million of the greenbacks, <strong>and</strong> are capable of guarding the bull for six months. The cooperationthey are asking for is that Hermes go <strong>and</strong> inspect the locations <strong>and</strong> provide recommendations to theoperational group about the best way to negotiate <strong>and</strong> collect…” 20The operation the Paraguayans were training for in the video was carried out on September21, 2004 under the leadership of Comm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago, in which Cecilia Cubas Gusinky, daughterof Paraguayan ex-president Raul Cubas, was kidnapped in San Lorenzo. However, negotiationsdidn’t go well. The Cubas family were not willing to pay the amount of ransom that was dem<strong>and</strong>ed.Instead, they counter-offered no more than 300,000 dollars, angering Comm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago. OnNovember 13, 2004 an internal meeting was held in which the EPP agreed to receive the moneyoffered, but not release Cecilia. This was done. In early December Comm<strong>and</strong>er Santiago reported ina meeting that they were at an impasse with the Cubas family, that the security team was in danger,<strong>and</strong> that the operation needed to be terminated <strong>and</strong> Cecilia murdered. Cecilia Cubas was reportedlykilled on Christmas Day, 2004. 21 Her naked decomposing body was found at the bottom of a wellin a house in Ñemby on February 16, 2005. It was later determined that she had been suffocated. 2213“EPP tenia por meta recaudar US$ 40 millones para llegar al poder en 2003,” La Nacion, October 25, 2009.14“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009 <strong>and</strong> “EPP tenia por meta recaudar US$ 40 millones para llegar al poder en 2003,” LaNacion, October 25, 2009.15“Vi formarse al EPP y tambien recibi entrenamiento guerrillero,” Ultima Hora, October 22, 2009.16“Las conexiones del EPP con las FARC,” ABC Color, October 16, 2009.17“Vi formarse al EPP y tambien recibi entrenamiento guerrillero,” Ultima Hora, October 22, 2009.18“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.19“Exhiben video en el que se observan prácticas para secuestrar a una mujer,” ABC Color, November 5, 2004.20“Prueba Reina,” Revista Semana, August 12, 2005.21“Los EPP no son mas de 14, pero tienen apoyo de mucha gente,” Ultima Hora, October 23, 2009.108<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2
The relationship between FARC <strong>and</strong> Patria Libre continued. An e-mail between RodrigoGr<strong>and</strong>a, the FARC’s representative in Venezuela, <strong>and</strong> Raul Reyes indicated that six Paraguayanswould arrive for a six-month training course in January 2005. 23 Meanwhile, the EPP beg<strong>and</strong>iversifying <strong>and</strong> exp<strong>and</strong>ing its operations. The Iturbe Sugar Mill was attacked in April 2004. 24 Inaddition the EPP attacked its first security target, taking <strong>and</strong> burning the police station at Kurusude Hierro, Concepcion. 25 Nobody seemed to pay attention; some thought the assailants were drugtraffickers. The EPP attacked <strong>and</strong> burned a second police station at Jhugua Ñ<strong>and</strong>u on April 18, 2006.The objective in both was to steal weapons. It is reported that Osvaldo Villalba, aka Comm<strong>and</strong>erAlex<strong>and</strong>er, yelled to the police comm<strong>and</strong>er, “Tell Nicanor (referring to then president of ParaguayNicanor Duarte) that this has just begun!” 26 Although no casualties were suffered at either policestation, the organization also began assassinating a small number of particularly troublesome orhated policemen. 27 Despite this, the government continued to regard these events as purely criminalactivity carried out by persons with drug trafficking or other criminal, not political, motivations.Patria Libre did have a political agenda in addition to its “military” operations. While theremay have been as few as 15-20 combatants at this time, they were able to gain the broad support ofmany individuals within several peasant organizations. 28 This was due to the great neglect by thegovernment of the peasant grievances in northern Paraguay. Patria Libre members had participated inthese movements since the early 1990s <strong>and</strong> continued to encourage <strong>and</strong> participate in road blockades<strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> invasions, offering protection to the marching peasants from police repression.From at least 2004 the insurgents began penetrating the Northern Peasants Organization orOCN. 29 In 2008, Patria Libre shifted its actions to more directly support the peasant organizationscauses. They kidnapped wealthy cattle-rancher Luis Lindstrom on July 31, 2008, who was releasedafter payment of a ransom of 300,000 dollars. 30 They also carried out several attacks against soyfarms, particularly those belonging to Brazilians. This played to twin causes. First, peasant protestsover commercial soy farming, which is most profitable on huge corporate farms, highlighted the factthat many peasants remained l<strong>and</strong>less.A second important argument played to a national distrust of Brazilian immigrants, known as“Brasiguayos.” The Brazilian immigrants acquired cheap l<strong>and</strong> in Paraguay, but rather than integrateinto Paraguayan society, remained in many ways tied to Brazil. They continued to speak Portuguese;created schools for their children in which the Brazilian educational curriculum was taught, flewthe Brazilian flag, <strong>and</strong> sang the Brazilian national anthem. The fear across Paraguay is that theBrasiguayos would eventually overrun <strong>and</strong> de facto “annex” Paraguay to Brazil.Two of the most significant attacks occurred on March 12, 2008, <strong>and</strong> December 5, 2008. Inboth incidents the targets were Brazilian owned farms, <strong>and</strong> hundreds of thous<strong>and</strong>s of dollars worthof vehicles, machinery <strong>and</strong> warehouses were set on fire <strong>and</strong> destroyed by armed <strong>and</strong> uniformedguerrillas. The December attack was the first EPP action during the Lugo government. 31 During theMarch attack flyers were left behind with the name People’s Army of Paraguay (EPP) on them. Thiswas the first time this designation was used publicly. 3222“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.23“Prueba Reina,” Revista Semana, August 12, 2005.24“Exhiben video en el que se observan prácticas para secuestrar a una mujer,” ABC Color, November 5, 2004 <strong>and</strong> “Practica filmada fue paraSecuestro de Cecilia,” ABC Color, March 1, 2005.25“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.26“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.27“EPP Inicio con Gobierno Anterior,” at http://concepcionnoticias.blogspot.com/2009/10/EPP-INICIO-CON-EL-GOBIERNO-ANTERIOR.htmlOctober 19, 2009.28“Los EPP no son mas de 14, pero tienen apoyo de mucha gente,” Ultima Hora, October 23, 2009.29“Mons. Zacarias cuenta evolución del EPP,” ABC Color, October 21, 2009.30“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.31“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, op., cit.32“Carmen Villalba afirma que seguiran incursiones armadas,” Ultima Hora, March 18, 2008.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2 109
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Document: Speech on “Security, In
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un tema de seguridad y defensa porq
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Los Intereses de la República Popu
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En el marco estratégico descrito e
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Works (FAW), Geeley, Dongfeng, y Ch
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interés en participar en el yacimi
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al emplear personas locales en todo
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había un banco en Colombia especia
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ehén de los FARC, escribe de siete
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estadounidenses en el futuro, y por
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26Security and Defense Studies Revi
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Existe numerosa literatura que trat
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La Tabla 1.1, demuestra que el apor
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Los cuestionamiento a este modelo d
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….derogaremos la Ley del Cobre y
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Figura 4.3.Aporte de CODELCO por ve
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Figura 6.Elaboración propia distri
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de los proyectos de defensa necesit
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En el caso de las inversiones en de
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Anexo 1PROTOCOLO DE ACUERDO QUE ACO
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OECD. “Models of Public Budgeting
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proyectos nacionales y democrático
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DesprofesionalizaciónEn la región
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Según algunos autores, “no sorpr
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(antinarcóticos), la Guardia Coste
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