would carry out the more violent tasks, such as assassinations, kidnappings or so-called “retentions”of members of the Paraguayan oligarchy, Paraguayan government officials <strong>and</strong> officials of foreigngovernments, attacking the armed forces, <strong>and</strong> recovering weapons. 47 A la the Argentine-born Cubanrevolutionary Ernesto “Che” Guevara, the EPP was to get their weapons from the enemy: “Whenwe speak of forces it is unavoidable to talk of weapons for the combat groups which will have theirautomatic rifles as the main weapon. Where do we get them? The enemy has them.” 48 An immediatetask to achieve plans for expansion was the acquisition of 10 rifles <strong>and</strong> 5,000 rounds of ammunition.“If objectives have been cased, the operation should be carried out.” 49In deed <strong>and</strong> action the EPP recognizes that revolutions cost a lot of money. “Any war in general,<strong>and</strong> a revolutionary war, like the one that we propose in particular, costs money, <strong>and</strong> the majorityof the necessary elements to carry it out cannot be obtained through the work of the people, butrather from the forced collaboration of the oligarchy <strong>and</strong> their government.”… “An armed forcetakes what is produced, as the armed men cannot dedicate themselves to farming the l<strong>and</strong> or otherproductive activities, as much as they would like to.” 50 The documents indicated that the major formof financial activity was to be kidnapping, while drug trafficking—a mainstay for EPP’s Colombianally, the FARC—has so far been avoided. However, perhaps inspired by the FARC, collaborationwith criminals was contemplated in the documents. People kidnapped by criminals could be keptprisoner in the zones of the EPP. The criminal organization would do the negotiations <strong>and</strong> receivepayment, for which they would pay the EPP 50% of the ransom for holding the prisoner. 51The documents show that EPP are both imaginative <strong>and</strong> thorough in their military planning.Among the documents captured in August was a plan to break the EPP members who have beenjailed out of prison. This plan called for the use of an armored car that could either be purchased ormanufactured. There were step-by-step instructions for either option. 52 In addition, the prisonerswould be armed from the inside with pistols <strong>and</strong> grenades that the EPP was introducing into theprison with the help of one of the guards. Nothing was being left to chance. There was also detailedintelligence on the prison, the number of guards, re<strong>info</strong>rcements, etc. The route of retreat appeared tobe through the Chaco. There were detailed notes about the various routes <strong>and</strong> all potential obstaclesalong these routes: police stations, bridges, culverts, gates, etc. Another document had <strong>info</strong>rmationon every police station in the San Pedro <strong>and</strong> Concepcion areas, their personnel, comm<strong>and</strong>ers,vehicles, weapons, radios, etc. 53The documents also discussed political tasks of the EPP. They talked about how the EPP couldpenetrate <strong>and</strong> form part of the peasant political groups to “capitalize on the popular sympathy thatwe have.” They mentioned how one of the peasant organizations of San Pedro desired to form arelationship with them in a new semi-legal organization that would be called the “Francist LiberationMovement (Movimiento Francista de Liberación”). 54 The Francist movement would be formed bypeople who didn’t want to join the EPP, but were sympathetic to the guerrilla cause. One documentconcluded: “I estimate that we will need more money to go public with a great mobilization.” Someof these plans may have already been implemented as it has been reported that banners with Francia’simage have been seen at recent protests. 55 In addition the documents discussed how the EPP couldsupport the peasant organization OCN. The spoke of cooperation between the EPP <strong>and</strong> OCN tocarry out l<strong>and</strong> invasions, <strong>and</strong> mentioned the need to “gain influence” in the Paraguayan AgrarianMovement in Upper Paraná, the EPP’s proposed base area. 5647Ibid.48Ibid.49Ibid.50Ibid.51Ibid.52Ibid.53Ibid.54After Paraguay’s founding president Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia.55Op. cit., “El Manual del EPP.”56Ibid.112<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2
From the documents <strong>and</strong> their actions, EPP has a clear rural political focus. Their main objectiveis to carry out revolutionary action against the Paraguayan oligarchy, government <strong>and</strong> foreigngovernments to support the struggle of the peasants. 57 They justify their war because “there is nodoubt that the government of Fern<strong>and</strong>o Lugo will not carry out the comprehensive agrarian reformpromised to the Paraguayan people.” (The centrality of the agrarian reform to the political platformof the EPP is very similar to that of the Colombian FARC.) If the government is not willing orable to carry out this comprehensive agrarian reform, the “situation forces the Paraguayan peopleto take the l<strong>and</strong> into their h<strong>and</strong>s <strong>and</strong> carry out the agrarian reform from below” through an allianceof workers, students, the homeless, <strong>and</strong> peasants. To overcome the establishment’s resistance thiscoalition should “make intensive use of violence.” The peasants should immediately “begin themassive occupation of large property” <strong>and</strong> “should go armed with whatever they can: shotguns,revolvers, rifles, machetes, slings, rocks, etc.,” but at the same time avoid taking pregnant women <strong>and</strong>children to the “battles for the l<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> liberty.” 58For the EPP, peace will only come after there is a war <strong>and</strong> the “people govern” through theestablishment of a Socialist Republic. 59 Before this can be done, everything must be destroyed<strong>and</strong> then rebuilt. 60 The guerrillas stressed that they do not believe in the current wave of regionalpopulist leftist governments. They have condemned all who make compromises with their declaredenemies, a list that included Lugo, President Lula of Brazil, the Kirchner dynasty in Argentina,Michele Bachelet of Chile, Alan Garcia of Peru <strong>and</strong> Tabare Velasquez of Uruguay. They call thesepresidents liars <strong>and</strong> traitors for having moderated <strong>and</strong> acted against radical rural movements. 61 Morespecifically they criticize Lugo, claiming his ideology is Catholic, not pure socialist, <strong>and</strong> they rejectany relationship with his ruling coalition which they condemn <strong>and</strong> faux socialist. 62At the same time, the EPP expresses admiration for Hugo Chavez, as much Chavista literaturehas been found in their camps, <strong>and</strong> they never criticize Evo Morales of Bolivia, although they claimthey have no relationship with the Paraguayan Movement Toward Socialism (PMAS), essentiallya clone of the Bolivian MAS <strong>and</strong> a group which strongly supports Lugo. 63 The EPP aspires tobelligerent status, a common goal shared with FARC, <strong>and</strong> freedom for their jailed comrades, whomthey call political prisoners. Not surprisingly their main international enemy is “Yankee imperialism”,but they also condemn Israel <strong>and</strong> surprisingly, for a Marxist movement, specifically <strong>and</strong> publiclysupport the Palestinian Hamas, a radical Islamic organization. This strange connection bears furtherinvestigation. 64ConclusionThe evidence indicates that EPP is a serious group that has been in development for more than twentyyears. They have an ideology <strong>and</strong> a strategic plan that they are systematically carrying out. Theyare still very small in numbers, but they are anything but amateurs. They have acquired training<strong>and</strong> assistance from the Colombian FARC, if not others. They have built up funds through bankrobberies <strong>and</strong> kidnappings, <strong>and</strong> gradually they are exp<strong>and</strong>ing their operations. Their insistence ongetting weapons by capturing them, <strong>and</strong> some of the actions of the EPP remind one of the attemptsto establish guerrilla “focos” in the 1960s. However, this comparison falls short. What distinguishesEPP from foquistas is the significant support base they seem to have built up among the radicalelements of the Paraguayan rural peasantry, particularly in the north of the country. It is also clearthat the EPP is trying to do everything it can to keep this base. A remarkable aspect of the actions57EEP, “Comunicado a la Opinión Pública,” 13 de noviembre, 2008.58Communique of the Paraguayan People’s Army, Wednesday November 19, 2008.59“Viva el Ejercito Popular Paraguayo, EPP!!!” as posted on http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2009/01/649390.php, on Friday, Jan. 16, 200960“Carmen Villalba reivindico pare el EPP ataque de Tacuati,” La Nacion, January 4, 2009.61“Viva el Ejercito Popular Paraguayo, EPP!!!” as posted on http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2009/01/649390.php, on Friday, Jan. 16, 200962“Carmen Villalba afirma que seguiran incursiones armadas,” Ultima Hora, March 18, 2008.63“Carmen Villalba da mas detalles sobre EPP,” Ultima Hora, March 18, 2008.64“Viva el Ejercito Popular Paraguayo, EPP!!!” as posted on http://argentina.indymedia.org/news/2009/01/649390.php, on Friday, Jan. 16, 2009<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2 113
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Document: Speech on “Security, In
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un tema de seguridad y defensa porq
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Los Intereses de la República Popu
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En el marco estratégico descrito e
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Works (FAW), Geeley, Dongfeng, y Ch
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interés en participar en el yacimi
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al emplear personas locales en todo
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había un banco en Colombia especia
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ehén de los FARC, escribe de siete
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estadounidenses en el futuro, y por
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26Security and Defense Studies Revi
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Existe numerosa literatura que trat
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La Tabla 1.1, demuestra que el apor
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Los cuestionamiento a este modelo d
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….derogaremos la Ley del Cobre y
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Figura 4.3.Aporte de CODELCO por ve
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Figura 6.Elaboración propia distri
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de los proyectos de defensa necesit
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En el caso de las inversiones en de
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Anexo 1PROTOCOLO DE ACUERDO QUE ACO
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OECD. “Models of Public Budgeting
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proyectos nacionales y democrático
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DesprofesionalizaciónEn la región
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Según algunos autores, “no sorpr
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(antinarcóticos), la Guardia Coste
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supervigilen las acciones intrusiva
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Quizás una de las fallas provenga
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