provided other regions in the world. Indeed, in terms of percentage, our total foreign direct investmentin the Hemisphere equals our direct investment in Asia, the Middle East, <strong>and</strong> Africa combined!Additionally, we should not forget that the nature of U.S. bilateral trade in the Hemisphere isfundamentally different than that of China’s. While the U.S. is a strong net importer from LatinAmerica, China is a net exporter. While the U.S. imported $385 billion from the region in 2008 <strong>and</strong>ran a roughly $100 billion trade deficit, China imported $71 billion from the Hemisphere (more thanfive times less than the U.S.). The relative benefits of U.S. trade in the region are clear. Finally, thenature of our economic engagement in the Americas encompasses more than trade <strong>and</strong> investment.As neighbors who share large populations of common heritage, our economic relationship includesfamilial ties. The clearest example of this, of course, is the flow of remittances from the U.S. to LatinAmerica <strong>and</strong> the Caribbean. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) estimates that $42.3billion in remittances will flow from the U.S. to the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds ofthe IADB’s estimated world-wide total of remittances to the Americas.I highlight these figures not because I fancy myself an economist or enjoy lulling my audienceto sleep by rattling off statistics, but rather because it puts into perspective the relative depth, scope,<strong>and</strong> long history of U.S. engagement in the Hemisphere. I believe it is important to keep this historyin mind in order to better frame discussions on countries whose engagement is relatively new to theregion. Of course, my comments on history <strong>and</strong> context should not be misconstrued. The rapidity atwhich Chinese, Latin American, <strong>and</strong> Caribbean trade is growing is noteworthy because it increasesthe likelihood that China could become an enduring part of the economic l<strong>and</strong>scape of the Americas.In the long-term, China’s investments <strong>and</strong> interests are likely to exp<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> evolve in ways both easy<strong>and</strong> difficult to predict, which is precisely why we have gathered here today.In returning to the notion of Chinese cooperation within a larger hemispheric framework, it isuseful to highlight what the U.S. Department of <strong>Defense</strong> considers to be some of the region’s biggestchallenges. At the Pentagon, three challenges in the Western Hemisphere that cause great concern<strong>and</strong> are most likely to benefit from China’s presence in the region include:1. Under-governed <strong>and</strong> ungoverned territories;2. Lack of economic opportunity; <strong>and</strong>3. Narcotics, arms, <strong>and</strong> human trafficking <strong>and</strong> other forms of transnational crime.It is my view that China’s deepening engagement in the Hemisphere can, in cooperation withothers, play a productive role in ameliorating some of the regional challenges I just listed. Inparticular, Chinese engagement in the Americas can help address problems related to under-governed<strong>and</strong> ungoverned territories, the region’s lack of economic opportunity, <strong>and</strong> the causal link betweeneconomic hardship <strong>and</strong> illicit trafficking. I am also open to exploring illicit trafficking as an avenuefor future cooperation in the region.When it comes to the problem of under-governed <strong>and</strong> ungoverned territories, policy prescriptionshave typically looked at building law enforcement <strong>and</strong> military capacities as the solution. And thisis a valid <strong>and</strong> important approach. Another potential way forward, however, is to approach thisproblem through economic investment that leads to socio-economic development. In this sense,China can play an important role because its presence serves as strong motivation for Latin Americancountries to improve their infrastructure in order to better capitalize on exp<strong>and</strong>ing Pacific markets.For example, investments have been made to enhance <strong>and</strong> modernize Pacific ports such as Ensenada,Buenaventura, Manta, Callao, <strong>and</strong> Iquique among others. The allure of Asian markets has alsoinspired new movement to connect distant corners of South America. In this case, examples includethe Manta-Manaus corridor <strong>and</strong> the São Paulo-Iquique corridor.136<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2
If successful, these infrastructure improvements would create a degree of inter-connectivitywithin the region that has proved difficult in the past because of challenging geography <strong>and</strong> resourceconstraints. This inter-connectivity could decrease the number of territories in the region thatlack adequate governance infrastructure because it would provide both an impetus for exp<strong>and</strong>edgovernment presence <strong>and</strong> more resources to make a more robust presence possible.In terms of the Chinese impact on economic opportunity in the Hemisphere, the U.S. positionapplies to the Americas as it applies across the world. We seek a global economy that promotes <strong>and</strong>facilitates sustained growth <strong>and</strong> greater socio-economic inclusion. As President Obama has said, “wehave a moral <strong>and</strong> pragmatic interest” in questions of development. We therefore welcome China’seconomic engagement in the region as a natural by-product of the global economy in the hope thatit fosters greater socioeconomic equality <strong>and</strong> further contributes to the sustained <strong>and</strong> increasinglyequitable growth already under way in countries such as Brazil <strong>and</strong> Chile. Diversified economieshelp lead to dynamic growth <strong>and</strong> increased stability. Furthermore, greater socioeconomic equality<strong>and</strong> mobility also strips away much of the initial motivation for those who enter into the world ofillicit trafficking: poverty.Of course, productive engagement between the U.S. <strong>and</strong> China in the Hemisphere must be basedon mutual respect <strong>and</strong> mutual interests, which will require that our relationship be rooted in mutualtrust. Although I am optimistic, there are no guarantees that these conditions will be fulfilled. Asa broad principle, the U.S. therefore seeks greater transparency from China about its interests <strong>and</strong>objectives in the region.U.S. security <strong>and</strong> prosperity are inextricably linked to our hemispheric partners. Again, this viewspeaks to the increasingly inter-connected world that has provided the framework for my remarkstoday. From a regional perspective, the Obama Administration’s position is clear: our security <strong>and</strong>prosperity depend on the improving security <strong>and</strong> prosperity of the Hemisphere as a whole.It would therefore be useful to have assurances, transparency, <strong>and</strong> concrete actions from Chinathat demonstrate it is ready to move beyond access to markets <strong>and</strong> raw materials to include issues suchas anti-corruption, more equitable development, <strong>and</strong> environmental protections in its hemisphericagenda. Concrete actions from China <strong>and</strong> its business community that promote sustainable <strong>and</strong> selfsustaininggrowth in the region will provide evidence that a convergence of interests between China<strong>and</strong> the U.S. in the Americas is not only possible, but likely.There is another area where more transparency is necessary. The Department of <strong>Defense</strong> hastaken note of an up-tick in military-to-military relations between China <strong>and</strong> the region. As regionalnews outlets have reported, China is pursuing technology transfers, increasing the frequency ofmilitary educational exchanges, <strong>and</strong> selling sophisticated military items such as air surveillanceradars <strong>and</strong> military aircraft. Other ventures have included space cooperation programs, perhaps mostprominently the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS) program.Of course, the provision of military goods <strong>and</strong> technology is st<strong>and</strong>ard in a global, open economy.Moreover, China has sold a number of goods that, if used appropriately, could contribute to combatingthe challenges in the region I listed earlier. Air surveillance <strong>and</strong> other radars, trucks, small boats, <strong>and</strong>night vision goggles improve domain awareness by increasing governments’ capacity to monitorterritory for suspicious activity such as narcotics <strong>and</strong> arms trafficking. Similarly, the sale of militaryaircraft designated as trainers can facilitate the professionalization of pilots, a necessity for a countryattempting to reduce under-governed <strong>and</strong> ungoverned territory.Again, what I am driving at here is transparency. The U.S. Department of <strong>Defense</strong> wouldwelcome the opportunity to dialogue with China on this topic <strong>and</strong> the others so far mentioned toforge a broader common underst<strong>and</strong>ing.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2 137
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Document: Speech on “Security, In
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6Security and Defense Studies Revie
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un tema de seguridad y defensa porq
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Los Intereses de la República Popu
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En el marco estratégico descrito e
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Works (FAW), Geeley, Dongfeng, y Ch
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interés en participar en el yacimi
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al emplear personas locales en todo
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había un banco en Colombia especia
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ehén de los FARC, escribe de siete
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estadounidenses en el futuro, y por
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26Security and Defense Studies Revi
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Existe numerosa literatura que trat
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La Tabla 1.1, demuestra que el apor
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Los cuestionamiento a este modelo d
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….derogaremos la Ley del Cobre y
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Figura 4.3.Aporte de CODELCO por ve
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Figura 6.Elaboración propia distri
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de los proyectos de defensa necesit
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En el caso de las inversiones en de
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Anexo 1PROTOCOLO DE ACUERDO QUE ACO
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OECD. “Models of Public Budgeting
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proyectos nacionales y democrático
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DesprofesionalizaciónEn la región
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Según algunos autores, “no sorpr
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(antinarcóticos), la Guardia Coste
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supervigilen las acciones intrusiva
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Quizás una de las fallas provenga
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Junto con ello se elaboró una nuev
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Colombia). Por otro, hay una serie
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Maldonado, Carlos, “Profesionalis
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policías y militares no ha estado
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La relación entre fuerzas militare
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dictaduras. En aquellos con más tr
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efectos de planificación se ha hab
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BibliografíaAguila, Ernesto y Mald
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Sherman, Lawrence. et.al. 1973. Tea
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Influenza Pandemic and its National
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and restaurant services” is expec
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