The political campaign that resulted in Lugo’s election divided the peasant movement <strong>and</strong>support for EPP. Some wanted to form a single, unified <strong>and</strong> disciplined movement with single line ofaction, an option favored <strong>and</strong> pushed by the members of the EPP <strong>and</strong> their supporters. Others wantedto form a loose political coalition around the figure of Lugo, the alternative that ended up prevailing.It is this divisive political dynamic that explains EPP’s continued activity despite a leftist presidentin power.To beat the Colorado party, Lugo <strong>and</strong> other leftist parties had to form a coalition with non-leftistopposition parties <strong>and</strong> groups, particularly the traditional opposition Liberal party. This meant thatthe Lugo socialist agenda was moderated to maintain the coalition. Some leftist parties saw this aspolitically expedient to win <strong>and</strong> maintain power, a position from which they could gradually playpolitics <strong>and</strong> implement their own agenda, much like what had been done in Venezuela <strong>and</strong> Ecuador.However, it meant that most of Paraguay’s traditional political <strong>and</strong> social structure remained inplace. The EPP regarded this as a betrayal. A June 4, 2009 communiqué declared that the guerrillaswould not stop their action based solely on a change of president. The only acceptable path wasto implement immediate “radical <strong>and</strong> revolutionary changes.” The EPP condemned “treacherouspretend socialists” who made alliances with “pro-imperialists” <strong>and</strong> “pro-oligarchy” factionsrepresented in Lugo’s coalition. They categorically stated: “clearly <strong>and</strong> decisively the revolutionwill not be made with opportunists like you that have renounced the right of progress…” 33Unhappy with Lugo’s presidency the EPP decided to carry out actions to get increased nationalattention. On December 31, 2008, about twenty armed <strong>and</strong> uniformed individuals entered the militarypost of Tacuatí, which was only garrisoned by three men. Faced by a superior force, the soldierssurrendered. They were then h<strong>and</strong>cuffed <strong>and</strong> put on display in the public patio. The insurgents stoletwo M-16s <strong>and</strong> 90 boxes of ammunition <strong>and</strong> threw grenades at the post structure, which caught fire<strong>and</strong> burned to the ground. Then the guerrillas scattered pamphlets with the name Popular ParaguayanArmy (EPP) on them <strong>and</strong> withdrew. 34 The attack was claimed to be in retaliation for the unsolveddeath of a peasant leader in Concepcion. 35This first attack on the military finally provoked a national response. More than 1,000 military<strong>and</strong> police were sent to the north to hunt for the insurgents. However, the operation was essentiallyfruitless, with no insurgents killed or captured. While the Army <strong>and</strong> police were beating the bushfor the EPP, the guerrillas had taken refuge on a small (11.5 hectare) farm in Yvyraty, 12 kilometersfrom Horqueta. They remained there until August 1, 2009. The camp was in a forested part of theproperty that belonged to Alej<strong>and</strong>ro Ramos Morel, a leader of the Northern Peasant Organization(OCN), <strong>and</strong> his wife, Lurdes Ramírez. To eat they stole cattle from the farms in the area, preparingsumptuous barbecues along with abundant Brahma br<strong>and</strong> beer (ironically a product of Brazil).Many people apparently knew of their presence but nobody reportedly denounced them either out ofpolitical sympathy due to EPP support for peasant l<strong>and</strong> claims through the OCN <strong>and</strong> other peasantorganizations, or out of fear. EPP took advantage of the lull to evaluate their situation <strong>and</strong> makefuture plans. This camp was not discovered until August 1, 2009 <strong>and</strong> then only by accident, when alocal peasant ran into the camp while he was looking for some stray cattle. The police came to searchthe farmhouse <strong>and</strong>, after a firefight, the EPP withdrew during the night. 36 Although the guerrillasescaped, they left behind a cache of documents, which would provide significant insight into thegroup’s nature, ideology, strategic <strong>and</strong> tactical plans. 37 More will be said about this later.33“Comunicado del EPP: Frente a la mentira reaccionaria, la verdad revolucionaria,” http://www.lahaine.org/index.php?p=17912, accessed June 4,200934“Atacan Destacamento military en Paraguay,” Associated Press, January 2, 2009.35“Carmen Villalba reivindico pare el EPP ataque de Tacuati,” La Nacion, January 4, 2009.36“El EPP farreaba con asado y cerveza cerca de Horqueta,” Ultima Hora, August 4, 2009.37“El EPP farreaba con asado y cerveza cerca de Horqueta,” op., cit.110<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2
While the police <strong>and</strong> the military flailed around in the countryside, the EPP scored a propag<strong>and</strong>acoup on April 30, 2009 by planting a propag<strong>and</strong>a bomb in the women’s bathroom of the NationalJustice Palace in Asuncion. The bomb was discovered <strong>and</strong> removed from the building to a nearbypatio, where it exploded harmlessly. 38 A few months later, the EPP carried out another high-profilekidnapping, on October 16, 2009 grabbing cattle rancher Fidel Zavala from his Estancia Mable farmin Paso Barreto. Led by Osvaldo Villalba between a dozen to 15 well-equipped <strong>and</strong> armed uniformedmen <strong>and</strong> women assaulted the farm house. Along with Zavala, the guerrillas carried off one of thefarm’s all-terrain vehicles, which they drove to another place on the l<strong>and</strong>, then ab<strong>and</strong>oned. They alsobooby-trapped the vehicle with an improvised bomb. When the truck was discovered <strong>and</strong> searched,the bomb exploded, wounding two police officers, one seriously. The kidnappers subsequentlydem<strong>and</strong>ed from the Zavala family a five-million dollar ransom. 39 The kidnapping provoked a newround of police <strong>and</strong> military operations in San Pedro <strong>and</strong> Concepcion departments, efforts that provedequally fruitless. (As the <strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> was being prepared for publication,Zavala was liberated after paying an unknown ransom, making statements to the press on behalf ofthe EPP <strong>and</strong> delivering butchered meat to poor communities.) 40Despite the seeming impunity of the group, however, some chinks do seem to be appearingin the EPP’s armor. The capture of the documents in August was important <strong>and</strong> there have alsosubsequently been at least two desertions from the group. The first was by a young woman whoappears to be an unimportant low-level recruit, 41 but the second deserter was Carlos Espínola, aka“Claudio,” trained outside Paraguay by Colombian <strong>and</strong> Ecuadorean specialists. Claudio appearedin the video in 2004 <strong>and</strong> was a member of the security team at the house in Ñemby, where CeciliaCubas was kept captive. 42 It is hard to judge how devastating this desertion will prove to be, but fora relatively small group it could be significant. Since that time several additional arrests have beenmade, mostly so-called logistical support elements to include Jose Villalba. 43The documents captured in August 2009 but probably written in early 2009 provide much insightinto the organization. First, they indicate that EPP has a strategic plan. EPP wanted to set up astrategic base area in the Upper Parana, a region which shares borders with Brazil <strong>and</strong> Bolivia. Thewooded terrain is difficult, making it an ideal area in which to hide. The borders provided majorlogistics routes into the zone as well as routes of retreat in the face of government action. 44 Inaddition, they would exp<strong>and</strong> into other areas of the country. In each of the areas the forces of the EPPwere to be divided into four categories: A) Full-time combatants, B) Part-time combatants or militias,C) Logistics support forces, D) Internal <strong>and</strong> External political support <strong>and</strong> propag<strong>and</strong>a). 45From Cuba to Concepcion <strong>and</strong> CaaguazuAt the time when the documents were written, in or about January 2009, the EPP claimed to numberaround 60 militants, but how these militants were divided up was not clear. Other <strong>info</strong>rmation mayindicate that most of these were non-combatants as plans were being made to have 30 full-timeguerrillas divided into three columns, each with responsibility for a department by 2010. Each ofthese columns was to be supported by a group of 10-15 militia members that could re<strong>info</strong>rce actionsas required. The target departments were Concepcion, San Pedro <strong>and</strong> Caaguazu. The militias wereto carry out ranch burnings, roadblocks <strong>and</strong> l<strong>and</strong> invasions. 46 Presumably the full-time guerrillas38“Larga Marcha del EPP,” Ultima Hora, October 25, 2009.39“Conmueve a Paraguay una ola de Secuestros Extorsivos,” La Gaceta, October 18, 2009. also “Identifican a hermano de Carmen Villalba comocabecilla del plagio,” http://concepcionnoticiasblogspot.com/2009/11/identifican-hermano-de-carmen-villalba.html, November 24, 2009.40“Fidel Zavala Serrati fue Liberado Anoche,” ABC Color, January 18, 2010.41“Se entrega joven vinculada al EPP,” ABC Digital, 17 de diciembre, 2009.42“Fiscal dice que Espínola es un experto en explosivos y rehenes,” Ultima Hora, December 30, 2009.43“Profugo Jose Villalba Cae en Concepción,” ABC Color, January 31, 2010.44“El Manual del EPP,” captured documents obtained from the Paraguayan Fiscalia catpured on August 1, 2009. Many of these documents were alsopublished in a special edition of La Nacion on January 23, 2010 entitled “El Documento del Terror: El Manaul del EPP.”45Ibid.46Ibid.<strong>Security</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Defense</strong> <strong>Studies</strong> <strong>Review</strong> 2009/Edición 2009/ Edicão 2009/ Volume 9, Issues 1 & 2 111
- Page 4 and 5:
Document: Speech on “Security, In
- Page 6 and 7:
6Security and Defense Studies Revie
- Page 8 and 9:
un tema de seguridad y defensa porq
- Page 10 and 11:
Los Intereses de la República Popu
- Page 12 and 13:
En el marco estratégico descrito e
- Page 14 and 15:
Works (FAW), Geeley, Dongfeng, y Ch
- Page 16 and 17:
interés en participar en el yacimi
- Page 18 and 19:
al emplear personas locales en todo
- Page 20 and 21:
había un banco en Colombia especia
- Page 22 and 23:
ehén de los FARC, escribe de siete
- Page 24 and 25:
estadounidenses en el futuro, y por
- Page 26 and 27:
26Security and Defense Studies Revi
- Page 28 and 29:
Existe numerosa literatura que trat
- Page 30 and 31:
La Tabla 1.1, demuestra que el apor
- Page 32:
Los cuestionamiento a este modelo d
- Page 35 and 36:
….derogaremos la Ley del Cobre y
- Page 37 and 38:
Figura 4.3.Aporte de CODELCO por ve
- Page 39:
Figura 6.Elaboración propia distri
- Page 42 and 43:
de los proyectos de defensa necesit
- Page 44 and 45:
En el caso de las inversiones en de
- Page 46 and 47:
Anexo 1PROTOCOLO DE ACUERDO QUE ACO
- Page 48 and 49:
OECD. “Models of Public Budgeting
- Page 50 and 51:
proyectos nacionales y democrático
- Page 52 and 53:
DesprofesionalizaciónEn la región
- Page 54 and 55:
Según algunos autores, “no sorpr
- Page 56 and 57:
(antinarcóticos), la Guardia Coste
- Page 58 and 59:
supervigilen las acciones intrusiva
- Page 60 and 61: Quizás una de las fallas provenga
- Page 62 and 63: Junto con ello se elaboró una nuev
- Page 64 and 65: Colombia). Por otro, hay una serie
- Page 66 and 67: Maldonado, Carlos, “Profesionalis
- Page 68 and 69: policías y militares no ha estado
- Page 70: La relación entre fuerzas militare
- Page 73 and 74: dictaduras. En aquellos con más tr
- Page 75 and 76: efectos de planificación se ha hab
- Page 77 and 78: BibliografíaAguila, Ernesto y Mald
- Page 79 and 80: Sherman, Lawrence. et.al. 1973. Tea
- Page 81: Influenza Pandemic and its National
- Page 84 and 85: and restaurant services” is expec
- Page 86 and 87: The ability of the health sector to
- Page 88 and 89: BibliographyAlmond, D. and B. Mazum
- Page 90 and 91: El trabajo parte del supuesto de qu
- Page 92 and 93: es tanto una elección voluntaria c
- Page 94 and 95: Por otro lado, Rusia nunca ha visto
- Page 96 and 97: La Organización del Tratado del At
- Page 98 and 99: liquidez internacional pero tambié
- Page 100 and 101: petróleo recientemente descubierta
- Page 102 and 103: Dentro de este esquema, Estados Uni
- Page 104 and 105: 104Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 106 and 107: minimize a number of attempts at fo
- Page 108 and 109: kidnapping, of Maria Edith de Deber
- Page 112 and 113: would carry out the more violent ta
- Page 114 and 115: of the EPP so far, is the relative
- Page 117 and 118: to accept ideas, policies or course
- Page 119 and 120: eing killed themselves—the idea t
- Page 122 and 123: In Latin America, the role played b
- Page 124 and 125: the Church to be given to the dying
- Page 126 and 127: from providing military chaplains t
- Page 128 and 129: Perhaps one of the clearest example
- Page 130 and 131: was prepared by the Office of the C
- Page 132 and 133: 132Security and Defense Studies Rev
- Page 135 and 136: Keynote Speech by Dr. Frank O. Mora
- Page 137 and 138: If successful, these infrastructure
- Page 139 and 140: Security, Intelligence and the Role
- Page 141 and 142: Clearly, security, intelligence and
- Page 143 and 144: Contratapa(Contratapa offers, in a
- Page 145 and 146: efforts have become intertwined; fo
- Page 147 and 148: comprensión de sus valores y cultu