Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

Turkish Probe December 2, 1993
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where they were placed into a special guest hotel run by
the PUK, and then transferred to the border.
Also, contrary to what Talabani says, what can be ob-,
served is thatthe Iraqi Kurds are not in complete control in
Zaleh. For months over, using this new corridor crossing
from Iranian territory, the PKK has infiltrated into Turkey
and the Kurdish leaders are now having trouble in explaining
why it came to this.
Barzani says it was a mistake, since after going to Zaleh
the PKK got open Iranian backing and "there is no way to
control it.'
When asked why the Iraqi Kurds did not just get rid of
the PKK problem from the very beginning, or why this organization
was not completely destroyed, Talabani's answer
is more complicated:
'We could not destroy them," he says. 'When they were
in Hakurk (the area wh.~rethe borders of Iran, Turkey and
Iraq meet) they had lninian support. Iran gives them arms
andammunition.
They were able to go there and return. If we had tried to
destroy the PKK, it could have fought with us for years and
years. A second reason is thatthe Kurdish public opinion
does not accept fighting the Kurds. The PKK enjoys strong
màss support and is a big organization. The third reason is
thatthe PKK was able to block the road from Diyarbakir to
Iraqi Kurdistan, to cut ail links between Iraqi Kurdistan and
Turkey.' To be more clear, the PKK had literally frightened
the Iraqi Kurds.
PKK in Iraq: As 'Barzani explains, the PKK's existence in
northern Iraq started immediately after the 1990 Iraqi campaign
againstthe Kurds. Once the area was evacuated by
hundreds of thousands of civilians frightened by Baghdad's
advancing forces, the PKK moved in.
In this period, Turkish Probe has documentation showing
close contact between the Iraqi intelligence, Mohabarat,
and the PKK. During the war with Kuwait, the PKK was
also collecting intelligence on Turkish and U.S. military activities
for the Saddam regime.
After 1991, though, the Iraqi Kurds started to resettle
and this led to a repopulation of the border region. This
disturbed the PKK, which tried to resist and maintain its
control in certain areas, and developments; as well as
escalated tension with the Kurds, led to the 1992 operation.
.
Both Barzani and Talabani now argue that there is no
serious PKK presence in the border zone, but for small
groups of 20 to 60 fighters which use mainly the snow-covered
paths to reach Turkey. On Nov.15, the Kurds
launched another operation but ended up without finding
anything. A film they took shows two Turkish officers also
saying the PKK is nowhere to be seen. The only serious
presence of the PKK, in the sense of having an established
base, is in Zaleh.
There, the militants are in control and have literally de.
clared the area a military zone. Even the PUK enters this
border crossing point with permission from the PKK, which
is armed, training and insistent. It is refusing to move. And,
the Iraqi Kurds are now well aware that if nothing can be
done aboutthis organization, they may have to sl:lfferdearly
for their lifeline, Turkey, is getting more and more impatient.
Provide Comfort: Obviously a cf!lcial link in the whole
issue is the multinationaltask force based in Incirlik, Turkey,
to protectthe Kurds, and many regional officials believe
that if part of Turkey's concern over the PKK presence
in Iraq is sincere, ano\her part is exaggerating it for
political purposes. Talabani argues that Prime Minister
Tansu Çiller and other politicians may be using the issue
for domestic political consumption -- turning atlention
abroad at a time Turkey's own campaign on terrorism is
yielding little results.
But both I eaders believe, observing the debate in
Turkey, and claims that Operation Provide Comfort is also
supporting the PKK, that the coalition forces should
not be used .as a instrument of blackmail against the
Kurds.
'What I really deny is the blackmailing of Kurds using
this Incirlik base as a tool, as a strict over our heads' Talabani
says. Barzani believes the extension of the mandate
of the multinational task forces is crucial for the Iraqi
Kurds. Talabani also carefully recalls whatthe late President
Turgut Özal had said. 'Thatthere are other ways for
the allied forces to protectthe Kurdish people, and that if
Turkey failed to participate it would lose its influence over
this force as well as its participation in dealing with events
in northern Iraq.'
He thus concludes that whatever the debate, it is in the
interest of the Turkish governmentto extend the mandate
for Provide Comfort.
Talabani also implies thatthe recent attention focusing
on PKK activities in northern Iraq may be part of the plot
againstthese forces -- noting that for ten months there was
not a single attack over Iraq on Turkey, but suddenly when
the mandate issue came on Turkey's agenda, the PKK issue
surfaced attt)e same time.
As for Barzani, he strongly argues against claims that
"the multinational task forces dubbed 'Hammer Force' by
the Turkish public, has led to a vacuum of authority in the
region, and that this vacuum is serving the PKK. 'Such
claims are lies," he says, recalling that Turkish officers are
continuously observing the activities of this force and that
nothing could be done without Turkey knowing it.
But it is clear that whatever altitude they take, both are
worried thatthe PKK issue could affect the future of this
force as well as future aid to be given to Iraqi Kurdistan.
More Problems: About 3.5 million people in northern
Iraq are now preparing to meet a harsh winter under the
protection of the multinationaltask force, and already with
enough on their minds without having to think of the PKK.
Despite Saddam's self-styled embargo on the, north and
the United Nations Security Council sanctions on the
whole of the country, there is serious reconstruction activity
in the Kurdish controlled areas.
Following the money crisis this year, with Saddam's
withdrawal of 25 dinar notes from the markel. economic
problems have doubled. Inflation on principle foodstuffs
alone is enough to make the masses worry.
Still, this region, which has suffered much from war, is
now pulling itself together step by step. And, within this
resurrection, there is a great amount of Turkish influence
which Ankara could turn to its advantage in the near future.
Kurdish television stations are "continuously showing Turkish
films and news programs, radios are casting Turkish
music, the streets are full of Turkish casseltes, and the cinemas
are screening Turkish movies (even if they are soft
porn movies) Il is as if the whole region is in hunger for
Turkish culture, and this alone stands asproof that the
Kurds are not natural enemies of the Turks, as some racist
circles have recently started to argue ..They are natural
friends.
Moreover, Turkey is the life line of this region. From its
o
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