Bulletin de liaison et d'information - Institut kurde de Paris

REVUE DE PRESSE-PRESS REVIEW-BERHEVOKA ÇAPÊ-RIVISTA STAMPA-DENTRO DE lA PRENSA-BASIN ÖZET;
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Turkish Probe December 2, 1993
economy to electricity, television to daily foodstuffs, Iraqi
Kurdistan depends more and more on Turkey, and the
Kurdish leaders are therefore worried about what is going
on in Ankara. They have too many internal problems but
are aware that as long as Turkey cannot solve her own
problems, they are bound to share the Turkish burden as
well.
Thus, it can also be observed that both Talabani and
Barzani express their concerns openly now, even to the
extent of criticising Turkish policy which, they say, is leading
to a growing regional crisis by strengthening the PKK.
Turlcish Policy: In order to improve their own ailing economy
and to survive, if need be, without Baghdad, the Iraqi
Kurds need Turkey but a Turkey which will not bring them
further problems.
Thus, despite their ethnic sympathies for the Turkish-
Kurdish people, and even their "understanding" of the position
of the PKK, they are against this organization. Both
the PUK and KDP accept that its terrorist methods cannot
be approved of. What angers their leaders is that the PKK
has come to a level which it does not deserve to be at.
Talabani says without any reservation that he condemns
terrorism in all forms and cannot accept any activity directed
at innocent civilians. "Everyone knows that we have always
criticized the killing of women and children in the villages,
the burning of villages, the destroying of villages
and houses," he says.
According to this leader, "the PKK is claiming to be a
Marxist-Leninist organization, but in fact it is a nationalist
organization ... not well experienced. Most of their leaders
are immature, and some of them are extremists"
As for Barzani, his criticism of the PKK appears to be
stronger. "Our party and our government are totally
against PKK terrorism," he says, noting also that this organization
has extensive support from Baghdad, Iran, Syria
and Armenia. Despite their differences in criticising the
PKK, though, both leaders agree that Turkey can only
solve its problem with the Kurds through peaceful dialogue
with legitimate representatives -- which can only be
achieved by allowing political alternatives to the PKK on
the legal platform.
Talabani here, is strong in his criticism. According to
him, "the Turkish hard-liners are the best friends of the
Kurdish hard-liners: .. They are helping each other very
much; they are exchanging assistance by encouraging
people to go to either side. Turkish hard-liners are always
strengthening the PKK. Look at the PKK and you will see it
is stronger than last year. This is because of the acts of the
Turkish hard-liners." "The best solution is to give rights
through peaceful and democratic means. To try to end it
with military methods is not a solution. Just the opposite --
it helps the PKK. But to seek a solution through peace and
democracy along with military measures is also good," is
what Barzani says.
Their mutual belief is that the main reason behind the
strengthening of the PKK, is the lack of a political or
peaceful solution to the problems of the Kurds in Turkey.
"And the PKK is using this, using the nationalist feelings of
Kurds to show that it is the defender and protector of .Kurdish
rights and demands," Talabani concludes.
Neither believe in claims from senior officials in Ankara
that the PKK problem can be overcome this year or the
next with the current policies, and both reflect their peoples'
criticism as well, of hardline policies which are inflicting
harm on Kurdish civilians in the Southeast.
Barzani's remark that "the Kurds cannot be liquidated
through war. Nowhere, neither in Iraq, nor in Iran, or Turkey,
an~ that the Kurds cannot achieve anything through
terrorist methods," seems to sum up their views.
Working on a Solution: Aware one way or another that
the PKK is a mutual problem, the Iraqi Kurds are now
working on a solution in their own way. Part of this is
based on strengthening their presence along the border area.
Although he does not say it openly, Barzani implies
that an operation in Zaleh is also imminent. The Kurds may
actually get rid of the PKK there -- which would only mean
that the separatists will use Iran instead.
There are about 50 fixed border stations in the border
zone with Turkey, and these are run jointly by PUK and
peshmerges. But the Kurdish complaint is that their army,
some 4,000 men, is not enough to control everywhere.
They even argue now that if there is infiltration, this is
from Turkey into Iraqi Kurdistan and not vice versa. In other
words, if Turkey cannot secure its own border with 180
thousand men, how can the Kurds, with their own problems,
do it with only 4,000?
Still, it appears that under the current circumstances
they are doing their best and whatever differences may be
sensed in their approach to the PKK, both the PUK and
KDP want to get rid of this problem.
Barzani has lost all hope of forcing the PKK to pull its act
together and has suffered more than anyone else from this
organization's activities. AlwAYS,during cross border incursions
by Turkey, his territory was the target. And always he
has been a primary target for the PKK.
Only last week, the regional Kurdistan govemment issued
a strongly worded condemnation of the PKK, after
militants of this organization attacked a peshmerge base in
Basiya village in Argush district and killed three Iraqi Kurds
and took 12 others as prisoners.
Kurdish public opinion is also heavily against the PKK,
but alwàys with a touch of sympathy, owing mainly to Turkey's
military based policies put into affect in the Southeast.
With or without Ankara's press blackout, and the auto-control
of the Istanbul press, ttie Kurds in the region
know what is going on and often, during conversations,
draw similarities to what happened in Iraq as well.
The most commonly heard remark in that part of the region
is: "Look, see what Baghdad did to us and see the result....
In this way, despite their strong feelings against the
PKK, many Kurdish officials are approaching the issue in a
cautious way.
Thus, they also fear that persistent Turkish operations
on northern Iraq will weaken their hand even further, especially
when damage is done to civilians and/or civilian settlements.
The Kurds, hate the "carrot and stick treatment," it it can
be called that. And they do not believe that civilian losses
in such operations are the result of mistakes. The general
belief is that these aim at taming them and the warning is
that such policies have always backfired.
Northern Iraq needs Turkey to survive and it needs Turkey
more than ever. What the Kurds ask now is more understanding
from Ankara, better cooperation in the fields of
economy and security, and a breath.
The concern is that any preemptive move by Turkey
would line tbe people behind the PKK and make it even
more difficult for this organization to be tackled with. And
indications are strong that soon, in the coming days, the
Kurds themselves will be taking dramatic action against
this organization. For they do not want Operation North
Iraq, once again... _
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