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on this basis. Addi� onally, the promo� on of good governance through aid
provision is not generally the primary concern of the aid fi nancing given
out by these ins� tu� ons. For example, the primary focus of the IMF’s
mandate is to promote macroeconomic and fi nancial stability by fostering
interna� onal monetary coopera� on, exchange rate stability, and helping
countries overcome economic diffi cul� es. Although it plays a greater role
in channeling global foreign aid fl ows to developing countries, and thus
provides a signifi cant por� on of the aid transfers that have proven so
problema� c for many Sub-Saharan economies, an organiza� on like the IMF
cannot withhold its assistance to countries in need on the basis of their poor
ins� tu� ons. Mul� lateral organiza� ons, therefore, must look for other ways
to improve the eff ec� veness of their lendings.
It must fi rst be made clear that regardless of whether greater selec� vity
becomes the modus operandi of foreign aid lending, the implica� on of the
Burnside and Dollar fi nding is not to suggest that poor countries with weak
ins� tu� ons cannot be helped at all. The inten� on is simply to suggest that
injec� ng more money into these countries is o� en not the answer, because
a shortage of capital is frequently not the main problem. In fact, foreign
aid aimed at achieving growth and development in these situa� ons more
o� en than not becomes part of the problem. Before any meaningful or
sustainable aid-led growth can take place, foreign assistance must aim at
catalyzing the ins� tu� onal reform and cul� va� ng the “social infrastructure”
that makes growth possible. As such, in poor governance environments,
donor resources are be� er suited to the transfer of ideas through technical
assistance, exper� se, and consul� ng services, rather than the transfer of
funds.
However, it is crucial to keep in mind that there is only so much that
external actors can do to foster internal ins� tu� onal reform in the Third World.
Given the considerable failures of past a� empts to impose Western reform
ini� a� ves, such as the Washington Consensus, on developing countries, care
must be taken to make foreign assistance as organic and tailored to the local
context as possible. Above all, this is necessary as to ensure that foreign
involvement does not come to be viewed as an ideological struggle and
provoke a local backlash. As such, eff orts are best catered to strengthening
local civil society, and empowering people by helping then learn how to help
themselves.
A lengthening of actors’ � me horizons will be cri� cal to the success of
this shi� in thinking about the role of foreign aid. Since ins� tu� onal reform
cannot be achieved overnight, both donors and recipients alike must have
the foresight to devise long-term solu� ons, the diligence to implement them,
and the pa� ence to await their slower but more sustainable outcomes.
This thinking o� en appears counterintui� ve because people naturally view
posi� ve feedback as an indica� on that their eff orts are working, and tend
to grow weary when these results do not appear quickly. Precisely because
the outcomes of reform are much slower and much less percep� ble in the
short-run, reform eff orts will o� en appear ineff ec� ve and self-defea� ng,
Changing paradigms of aid eff ec� veness in Nepal 71