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Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution

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THE BATTLE FOR CHINA’ S PAST<br />

In order to prevent what was perceived to have happened in <strong>the</strong><br />

<strong>for</strong>mer Soviet Union, <strong>Mao</strong> decided to carry out what was called <strong>the</strong><br />

Socialist Education Movement <strong>and</strong> Liu was put in charge of this. In<br />

November 1963 Liu sent his wife, Wang Guangmei, to <strong>the</strong> Tao Yuan<br />

Brigade of Hebei province to do a pilot project on Socialist Education<br />

in rural China. In June 1964 Liu took a work tour in Hebei, Shanghai,<br />

Henan, Sh<strong>and</strong>ong <strong>and</strong> Anhui, promoting his wife’s work in what was<br />

called <strong>the</strong> Tao Yuan Experiment. Liu asserted that Wang Guangmei’s<br />

pilot project showed grassroots organization in rural China was<br />

completely rotten, ei<strong>the</strong>r corrupted or changed politically to be on <strong>the</strong><br />

side of class enemies: <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong>lords, rich peasants <strong>and</strong> counter-revolutionaries.<br />

Liu ordered all senior party officials to carry out<br />

investigations like Wang by staying in one village <strong>for</strong> a long period of<br />

time (<strong>the</strong> Chinese term is 蹲点 dun dian). Liu shocked his attentive<br />

audience when he <strong>for</strong>cefully told <strong>the</strong>m that those who did not dun dian<br />

would not be qualified to be members of <strong>the</strong> CCP central committee.<br />

He also added that <strong>Mao</strong>’s work should not be taken as dogma, that<br />

<strong>Mao</strong>’s investigative method of group interviews was out of date <strong>and</strong><br />

that a new way of encamping in a village to establish contacts (zhagen<br />

chuanlian) was required.<br />

<strong>Mao</strong>’s idea was totally different however. He thought that <strong>the</strong> majority<br />

of grassroots cadres should not be <strong>the</strong> targets of struggle <strong>and</strong> that<br />

parachuting in so many people from <strong>the</strong> outside to one place to carry out<br />

struggle was politically wrong <strong>and</strong> technically impossible: it was wrong<br />

politically because <strong>the</strong> assumption was that <strong>the</strong> local people could not be<br />

trusted. It was technically impossible because <strong>the</strong>re was no way in which<br />

resources could be mobilized to carry out <strong>the</strong> task <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> whole country.<br />

When <strong>Mao</strong>’s personal secretary Tian Jiaying, on <strong>Mao</strong>’s instructions,<br />

conveyed <strong>the</strong> two points to Liu, Liu frowned <strong>and</strong> said nothing. Though<br />

he was not very keen on <strong>the</strong> Tao Yuan Experiment, <strong>Mao</strong> initially agreed<br />

to make <strong>the</strong> Wang Guangmei Report a CCP document <strong>for</strong> circulation, as<br />

Liu recommended. However, he soon changed his mind <strong>and</strong> ordered <strong>the</strong><br />

withdrawal of <strong>the</strong> Report. According to Wang Li (2001), this was mainly<br />

because Jiang Qing had reported Liu’s work-tour speech to <strong>Mao</strong> by<br />

saying: ‘Liu is already criticizing you when you are still alive, whereas<br />

Khrushchev made <strong>the</strong> secret report denouncing Stalin only when <strong>the</strong><br />

latter was dead.’ However, Wang Li admits that he interpreted <strong>Mao</strong>’s<br />

change of mind in that way only because that was what Jiang Qing had<br />

told him. He also admits that <strong>Mao</strong> changed his mind after consulting<br />

o<strong>the</strong>r provincial leaders such as Li Xuefeng, Wu Lanfu, Tao Lujia <strong>and</strong> Liu<br />

Zihou.<br />

To carry out <strong>the</strong> struggle against grassroots cadres, Liu sent work<br />

teams totalling 15,000 people from outside into <strong>the</strong> county of Xincheng,<br />

which had a population of less than 300,000. <strong>Mao</strong> asked Liu: how could<br />

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