Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution

tong. This is not surprising as Chinese historiography was designed to
write history that serves the present (Unger 2002). As early as the Spring
and Autumn Period historians were determined to make ‘the disloyal
treacherous officials fear’. Qing historians were ordered to use the same
technique and ideology to evaluate Ming history so that examples could
be set for Qing officials. The function of historians was to establish examples
for officials by condemning the bad and by praising the good.
According to Chen Shengyong (1994), this is the case with the important
classical history books Zuo zhuan (The Commentary of Zuo), Shi ji (The
Historical Record), Han shu (The Book of Han), San guo zhi (The Record
of the Three Kingdoms) and Zizhi tongjian (The Comprehensive Record
as a Mirror for Rulers).
Memories as history
CONSTRUCTING HISTORY
Despite the limitations of this category of literature, occasional exceptions
can provide insights and valuable information if one ploughs
through them with a critical attitude. In one book, for instance, Quan
provides some personal insight into Peng Dehuai’s downfall. Quan
reveals that at the 1959 Lushan Conference, Mao, who was intending
to cool down the Great Leap Forward, initially did not find Peng’s
letter criticizing the Great Leap Forward too offensive. Mao thought
that Peng had ‘zichanjieji dongyaoxing (bourgeois vacillation) and only
commented that Peng always gave him negative material. Mao still
intended to conclude the conference as had been scheduled. However,
when Mao gave his final speech, Peng chose not to sit with other
members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, who, according
to the customary hierarchical arrangement, were to sit on a (raised)
platform facing the less prominent party officials. Instead, Peng took a
seat at a back row among the lesser mortals, with his head recently
shaven bald, a clear sign of challenge. Mao remarked that if the army
did not want to follow him he could lead another guerrilla war.
According to Quan this remark was directed at Peng, who was the
Minister of Defence, a typical dry humour of Mao.
After the speech, Mao and Peng bumped into each other when they
came out of the conference hall. Mao smiled at Peng, and took the
initiative in greeting him and invited him to have a talk, to which Peng
replied in a loud voice, ‘There is nothing to talk about!’ and walked off.
This encounter took place in front of many senior CCP leaders. Later
when Mao went back to his residence several ‘CCP leaders’ came to
offer critical remarks about Peng and suggested to Mao that the conference
should be prolonged to solve the problem of ‘the struggle
between the two lines’. Quan’s account offers an angle that is absent
from the version offered by Li Rui, which is widely accepted in the
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