Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
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CHALLENGING THE HEGEMONY II<br />
that launched <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong>. <strong>Mao</strong> also refused to approve<br />
Chen Yonggui’s (<strong>the</strong> Party Secretary of Dazhai Brigade who was<br />
promoted to be a vice-premier of <strong>the</strong> State Council) suggestion of<br />
making <strong>the</strong> production brigade, instead of <strong>the</strong> production team, as <strong>the</strong><br />
basic accounting unit. 4<br />
One important evidence <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> argument that economy stagnated<br />
during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong> was that workers’ salaries actually went<br />
down over ten years, from an average of 583 yuan a year in 1966 to 573<br />
yuan a year in 1976. However, Chu points out that during <strong>the</strong> same<br />
period <strong>the</strong> total expenditure on salaries in China went up by 65 per cent.<br />
What happened was that while <strong>the</strong> salaries were kept down, more<br />
people became employed. Obviously in a country where <strong>the</strong>re was no<br />
inflation <strong>and</strong> where prices of all <strong>the</strong> daily life goods were capped by <strong>the</strong><br />
state, salary increases are not as important as full employment <strong>for</strong> equality<br />
<strong>and</strong> <strong>for</strong> ensuring <strong>the</strong> livelihood of all. In ano<strong>the</strong>r contribution, Chu<br />
(2007) lists detailed figures of how China developed high-tech national<br />
defence science, how Chinese petroleum <strong>and</strong> electronic industries developed<br />
<strong>and</strong> how local industries <strong>and</strong> irrigation infrastructure exp<strong>and</strong>ed<br />
during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong> period.<br />
The strategic significance of <strong>the</strong> third-line industry <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> cold<br />
war<br />
Apart from listing evidence <strong>and</strong> statistics that show <strong>the</strong> economic<br />
development <strong>and</strong> technical achievements during <strong>the</strong> <strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong>,<br />
Chu presents two points directed at <strong>the</strong> critics of <strong>Mao</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
<strong>Cultural</strong> <strong>Revolution</strong>. One was <strong>the</strong> development of <strong>the</strong> third-line<br />
industry, which used a lot of capital <strong>and</strong> resources to build up industrial<br />
bases such as <strong>the</strong> satellite-launching base in China’s remote south<br />
<strong>and</strong> northwest. Chu quotes Deng Xiaoping <strong>and</strong> Jiang Zemin to show<br />
that with hindsight, especially since <strong>the</strong> Iraq war, <strong>the</strong> third-line policy<br />
was far-sighted <strong>and</strong> strategically significant <strong>for</strong> China.<br />
Chu’s o<strong>the</strong>r point concerns <strong>the</strong> accepted wisdom that <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mao</strong> era<br />
chose to close itself off from <strong>the</strong> outside world <strong>and</strong> that China opened up<br />
only after <strong>Mao</strong>’s death. Chu points out that as early as 1964 <strong>and</strong> 1965<br />
<strong>Mao</strong> raised <strong>the</strong> prospect of allowing <strong>the</strong> Japanese to open up factories in<br />
China. It was not <strong>Mao</strong> or China that refused to open to <strong>the</strong> West. Instead,<br />
it was <strong>the</strong> West that imposed economic sanctions against China. It was<br />
<strong>Mao</strong> who initiated <strong>the</strong> re-establishment of relationship with <strong>the</strong> United<br />
States The US government led by Richard Nixon <strong>and</strong> Henry Kissinger<br />
responded to <strong>Mao</strong>’s initiative only because <strong>the</strong>y hoped to play <strong>the</strong> China<br />
card to balance <strong>the</strong> perceived threat of <strong>the</strong> Soviet Union <strong>and</strong> wanted<br />
China to help end <strong>the</strong> Vietnam War. It was <strong>the</strong> US strategic shift that<br />
made it possible <strong>for</strong> China to be more open to <strong>the</strong> outside world. Coun-<br />
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